

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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INTER-AMERICAN COOPERATION MOVES FORWARD • Address by Secretary Herter	754
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TODAY • by Under Secretary Dillon	723
THE APPROACH TO THE SUMMIT • by Assistant Secretary Berding	729
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE • by Wallace R. Brode, Science Adviser	735
THE INTERNATIONAL LEAD AND ZINC STUDY GROUP • by C. W. Nichols	758
THE FIRST JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES—1860 • Article by E. Taylor Parks	744

For index see inside back cover

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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American Foreign Policy Today

by Under Secretary Dillon¹

The conference you have just concluded provides renewed evidence, if indeed any were needed, that American labor is conscious today as never before of the great efforts which our country must make in the never-ending search for peace. American labor well knows that we can no longer think of our security as something apart, enshrined in a "Fortress America." American labor recognizes that we cannot continue indefinitely to enjoy our material well-being unless other peoples, particularly the underprivileged of the newly developing areas, also prosper. American labor is a truly influential force whose understanding and support of our international objectives are essential to their achievement. I therefore welcome this timely opportunity to discuss three major aspects of our foreign policy:

First, our efforts to preserve the liberty and strength of the free world and to resist the Sino-Soviet imperialistic drive.

Second, our efforts to keep the fierce and inescapable struggle to which we have been challenged by the Communist leaders from exploding into war.

Third, our long-range search for a world order capable of securing peace with justice and freedom.

Soviet power and determination to expand Communist influence throughout the world pose grave and continuing threats to peace. Despite constant talk of "peaceful coexistence," there is no evidence that Communist expansionist ambitions have altered in the slightest. It is true that

Soviet rulers now appear anxious to pursue their unchanging goals through nonmilitary tactics—through diplomacy, trade, economic aid, propaganda, and internal subversion. However, they remain confident that the totalitarian system shall prevail. Their present emphasis on nonmilitary measures does not mean that the struggle will be less intense nor the stakes less important. The primary issue today is nothing less than the survival of free men in a free civilization.

Meanwhile the Sino-Soviet bloc maintains enormous military power, which reinforces its constant pressure upon the free world. The risk of armed conflict is always with us. We must mount a vigorous and continuing effort to contain that risk if peace is to be kept.

A first imperative is to maintain our military strength at a level which will insure that the Soviet leaders will never be tempted to unleash thermonuclear war against the United States or its allies. We have such strength today, and I can assure you that our present and projected defense programs will maintain and reinforce this essential strength.

Another imperative is to maintain and reinforce our collective system of defensive security pacts, involving nearly half a hundred nations and reaching the farthest corners of the globe. This collective strength is urgently required to deter the Communists from using local military force—as they did 10 years ago in Korea—to expand their empire. Its need is pointed up by the actions of the Chinese Communists in the Straits of Taiwan, their crime against Tibet, and their recent military pressures on the borders of India.

So long as danger persists and there is no general and effective system of arms control, we and our allies must keep up our defenses. We must

¹Address made before the AFL-CIO Conference on World Affairs at New York City on Apr. 20 (press release 202).

not be deluded by any superficial appearance of *détente* into relaxing these efforts.

But this is not enough. To keep the peace we must also try to establish rational communication with the Soviet Union. Despite undiminished Soviet ambitions, there is considerable evidence that the Soviets, like ourselves, are conscious of the dangers of the present situation and wish to reduce the risks of major war. We are seeking to verify this through negotiation. Our immediate objective is to minimize the risk of war by miscalculation. Our ultimate objective is the removal of these dangers through settlement of outstanding issues and the creation of a stable world order. This, however, is a long-range goal which cannot be realized unless and until the Communist leaders abandon their imperialist ambitions.

With these objectives in mind, we are engaged in the arms control conferences at Geneva and are preparing for the summit meeting next month in Paris.² We are and shall be openminded in our search for agreements which could alleviate the present dangerous confrontation—but without sacrificing those principles we deem to be right and just.

Problem of Germany, Including Berlin

The central issue confronting the Soviet Union and the Western nations at the summit is the problem of Germany, including Berlin. No issue on earth today is more critical. It involves the immediate fate of 2¼ million West Berliners and the ultimate destiny of about 70 million Germans. It bears directly upon the future stability of Central Europe and the possibility of a lasting European peace. It represents a critical test of the integrity and dependability of the free world's collective security systems, because no nation could preserve its faith in collective security if we permitted the courageous people of West Berlin to be sold into slavery. It also represents a critical test of Soviet good faith in all areas of negotiation. For the goals of disarmament and the general improvement of East-West relations have no prospect of attainment if we find that the Soviet rulers or their East German puppets are prepared to use force or the threat of force in an attempt to isolate and subjugate West Berlin. Finally, we must recognize that the issue of Germany and

Berlin, if it cannot be resolved through negotiation, may involve the gravest of all issues: the issue of peace or war.

In the long run the problem of Germany and Berlin can only be solved through German reunification. This the Soviets have so far rejected, fearing to put their rule in East Germany to the test of a free vote. But we cannot abandon our goal or abate our efforts toward its achievement, because we know that a divided Germany will remain a powder keg so long as the division persists. Meanwhile we are willing to consider interim arrangements to reduce tensions in Berlin and lessen present dangers. But we are determined to maintain our presence in Berlin and to preserve its ties with the Federal Republic. We will not accept any arrangement which might become a first step toward the abandonment of West Berlin or the extinguishing of freedom in that part of Germany which is a free, peaceful, and democratic member of the world community.

Soviet View of Berlin

It would be highly optimistic to pretend that prospects of an early agreement are bright. Mr. Khrushchev has had a great deal to say recently which bears upon Berlin and Germany, and his words leave the inescapable impression that the Soviet view of Berlin is far removed from the facts. Let us examine some of his comments.

He begins with the assertion that West Berlin lies "on the territory" of the so-called German Democratic Republic. This is not only false; it is contrary to the pledged word of the Soviet Government. While it is true enough that the Soviet-occupied portion of Germany surrounds Berlin, it is equally true that Berlin was given separate status under the occupation agreement, which the Soviets themselves formulated, together with the British and ourselves.³

Moreover, the so-called German Democratic Republic is one of the outstanding myths in a vast Communist web of prodigious mythology. Its puppet rulers are totally under the control of Moscow. Despite tireless efforts to build a local Communist apparatus in East Germany, it is doubtful that these rulers could remain in power for a single day without the support of Soviet bayonets. The

² For background, see BULLETIN of May 2, 1960, p. 683.

³ For text of the 1944 agreement defining the status of Berlin, see *ibid.*, Apr. 11, 1960, p. 554.

East German regime is not recognized as a government by any non-Communist nation. Both legally and as a matter of geographic fact, West Berlin is entirely independent of the so-called German Democratic Republic—and it will remain so.

Mr. Khrushchev continues to insist that Western forces leave West Berlin and that it be declared a "free city." He ignores the fact that West Berlin is already a free city—the lone island of freedom within the boundaries of the sprawling Communist empire. When he speaks of making West Berlin a "free city," his meaning is only too clear: He desires West Berlin to be free from protection, free from security, free from its commercial and cultural ties with West Germany—and cut off from freedom itself.

Mr. Khrushchev has also complained that the situation in Berlin is "abnormal." With this contention we can wholeheartedly agree. It is indeed abnormal when 1 million East Berliners are forcibly divided from more than 2 million fellow citizens in West Berlin, when they are constrained to live under a totalitarian regime unlawfully imposed by a foreign power, and when even family units are divided by an arbitrary boundary imposed in the name of a foreign ideology.

But the abnormal situation in Berlin is merely one facet of the greater abnormality created by the artificial separation of the East Zone from the remainder of Germany. The monstrous nature of this abnormality has been strikingly demonstrated by the fact that more than 2½ million East Germans and East Berliners have, during the last 10 years, exercised the only franchise available to them and have voted with their feet against Communist rule by fleeing to West Berlin and the Federal Republic.

The abnormality of which Mr. Khrushchev speaks can be cured only by permitting the whole German nation to decide its own way of life. The only practical way in which they can exercise this right is through free elections. Mr. Khrushchev and other Soviet spokesmen have often proclaimed their devotion to the principle of self-determination. This pretense is exposed as an empty gesture when they refuse to apply that principle to Berlin and Germany.

Mr. Khrushchev has also argued that we must move rapidly to liquidate the "leftovers" of the Second World War, among which he includes what he describes as the "occupation" of West Berlin by American, British, and French forces.

We are even more anxious than Mr. Khrushchev to liquidate the leftovers of World War II. But Mr. Khrushchev must recognize that these leftovers are rather numerous:

Is the Soviet Union prepared to remove its forces from East Germany and the Eastern European countries on which they are imposed?

Is it willing to grant self-determination to the East Germans and to permit the peoples of the Soviet-dominated states in Eastern Europe to choose their own destiny?

Is it willing to abandon the fiction of a separate north Korea and to permit the entire Korean people to reunite under free elections supervised by the United Nations?

Is it at last willing to cease obstructing the operation of the United Nations Charter—to which the Soviet Union pledged itself in San Francisco and whose application it has consistently frustrated by a series of vetoes in the Security Council?

The United States and its Western allies would be happy indeed to see these leftovers of World War II liquidated. But we are not prepared to begin this process by permitting the isolation and engulfment of West Berlin.

We have repeatedly informed Mr. Khrushchev that we will not negotiate under duress. Yet in his recent statements about his intentions to sign a separate peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic unless an East-West agreement is reached on Berlin, he is skating on very thin ice. We are approaching the summit with every intention of seeking a mutually acceptable solution of the German problem, including Berlin, of seeking just settlements of other international differences, and of exploring ways to improve relations between the Western World and the Soviet bloc. Our positions are flexible, and we are willing to explore every reasonable avenue that may lead to agreement. But Mr. Khrushchev and his associates will be profoundly disillusioned if they assume that we will bow to threats or that we will accept their distorted picture of the German problem as a factual premise upon which to negotiate.

No organization has stood more firmly or been more helpful in the fight for the freedom of Berlin and all Germany than the AFL-CIO. It was in recognition of this fact that your president last December 7th received a high decoration from Chancellor Adenauer. As a Government, we are

proud to associate ourselves with Mr. [George] Meany's statement on that occasion:

Neither the freedom of West Berlin, nor the freedom of the 50 million people of West Germany, can be objects of international bargaining.

Program for Victory

I have so far outlined those policies which we are pursuing in order to keep the peace. But this alone is not enough. We are energetically striving to advance the freedom and well-being of all the world's peoples. This is our "program for victory"—victory over want and misery in the period of intensified competition with communism that lies ahead.

Your executive council has well stated:

Hundreds of millions of people throughout the world live in abject poverty and are denied the essentials of political and spiritual freedom. Soviet imperialism continues to intensify and place increasing emphasis on attempts to exploit this poverty and injustice.

It is these underprivileged and newly developing peoples who are increasingly the target of Soviet policy. The Communist drive is far more than economic; it also involves political, psychological, and cultural factors.

As free men we have accepted the Communist challenge in the newly developing areas, confident that our society and principles represent the revolutionary dynamic of freedom that must ultimately prevail. We must continue to carry the message of freedom and share its rewards with the less privileged peoples. Unless they can have hope for the future, their desperate poverty may incline them to Communist panaceas. We must continue to help them gain a stake in freedom. We must work with these peoples to build up their countries on the same basis of mutuality of interest that has guided the diverse groups in the United States in working together to build our great country.

The welfare of all the newly developing areas is a matter of deep concern to us. The position of our friends and neighbors in Latin America is of special importance, and I can assure you that we shall never take our southern neighbors for granted. We are sincerely interested in the advancement of the newly emerging peoples of Africa, and our concern is by no means limited to material progress. We are deeply sympathetic

to the yearnings of the African peoples for dignity and equality. It is our sincere hope that the United Nations Security Council resolution of April 1st,⁴ which deplored current developments in South Africa and called upon the Secretary-General to consult with the Government of South Africa, will prove to be effective.

I know that I do not have to appeal to you for support in our efforts to extend the blessings of freedom to all men, everywhere. In the resolutions adopted by your convention at San Francisco last September, you called for "an expanded, long-term and fully effective program of economic aid and technical assistance to the industrially less developed nations."

Your strong support of this program is most welcome. I know that you, like most Americans, look upon our Mutual Security Program as a direct investment in our own future safety and well-being.

Private American groups, notably labor, are important in communicating the ideas and values of a free society. Great work has been done by the AFL-CIO, both on its own and with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, in assisting free labor organizations in many parts of the world. This work has already made a vital contribution to the development of peoples newly emerging into freedom and statehood.

Labor, as we know, has always been a major target of Communist subversion. With the increased emphasis which the Soviet Union has begun to place on economic penetration, the AFL-CIO and the free labor organizations abroad with which it is associated will be confronted with an even greater challenge in the years ahead. The new Communist competition is being directed very intensively at labor organizations in the developing countries. The task of American labor in making its experience of economic advancement in a democratic framework understandable and usable to the newly developing countries is indeed a challenge which will increasingly require all the ingenuity and perseverance that it can muster. Free labor is in an especially favored position to bring this message to the workers of the developing countries and to point up the illusory nature of the Communist appeal to achieve economic de-

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 25, 1960, p. 669.

velopment at the cost of personal and national freedom. Free labor, I am confident, will continue to play a highly significant and constructive role in providing ideological leadership, technical guidance, and its rich experience in freedom in support of the legitimate aspirations of workers throughout the free world.

In our dealings with the peoples of the newly developing areas we must always be aware that what we do here at home has a direct bearing on our success abroad. Our country projects its image to all peoples, for better or worse. They are impressed by what we do rather than by what we say. If they see us dealing effectively with our own internal problems—economic, educational, racial, political—they will have the best answer to the Communist argument that only by imitating its own degrading, totalitarian methods can new nations achieve economic development and a high standard of living.

We can and must demonstrate through sustained economic growth that freedom works—that it, better than communism, can mobilize human energies and bring about equitable sharing of the fruits of labor. We can and must bury the Soviet myth that our system is decadent while communism is the “wave of the future.”

We can do this—but only if we are deeply aware that our problems are world problems. We must realize that all we do, or fail to do, here at home has a global impact and affects American interests throughout the world.

“Peaceful Coexistence,” Soviet Style

We know what “peaceful coexistence” means to the Soviets. The Communist interpretation of “peaceful coexistence” is illustrated by their deeds as well as by their words. Even as they enunciate their doctrine, they proclaim in the same breath that the Communist system will ultimately absorb all other societies. Meanwhile they continue to direct a deluge of poisonous propaganda against neighboring states and to make pronouncements aimed at stirring up domestic controversies within those states. Their subversive agents and puppet political parties are active in nearly every country in the world. Their economic and trading relationships with other countries are designed not just to further legitimate trade interests but as levers to increase their political influence and

power. This is “peaceful coexistence”—Soviet style—in action. We also know that to the Soviet Union “peaceful coexistence” even includes the use of military force whenever it suits their purposes, as in the brutal repression of freedom in Hungary.

Actually the very phrase “coexistence” is both weird and presumptuous. Until the rise of such modern totalitarian systems as nazism and communism, the right of separate states and systems to exist was unquestioned. Coexistence has always been assumed to be a minimal condition of peaceful international relations.

But even this minimal concept of “live and let live” is totally inadequate in today’s world. We must live and *help* live. What the world really needs is cooperation, a positive and vigorous cooperation through which all systems and societies can join hands in seeking solutions to pressing human problems. The United States believes in the right of all peoples to choose their own beliefs and systems with mutual tolerance and respect for one another. We are convinced, because of our own national experience, that diversity is as useful as it is inevitable, that human differences represent a vital fountainhead of human progress. Let us therefore relegate to the scrap heap the concept of a transitory and uneasy coexistence and seek instead to utilize the diverse attitudes and talents of all peoples to solve the age-old problems of poverty, disease, ignorance, oppression, and injustice. Let us cooperate affirmatively to develop the structure and tissue of a true world community.

Search for an Orderly World Community

Now, what is the goal toward which we are striving? What kind of world do we want to see eventually come into being?

We seek an orderly world community in which the danger of war is no more and where the rule of law allows man to safely devote his energies to the arts of peace.

In its preamble the Western disarmament plan,⁵ which was proposed last month at Geneva, makes this clear. It sets as an ultimate goal a secure,

⁵ For text of a working paper on general disarmament released on Mar. 14 by Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, see *ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1960, p. 511.

free, and peaceful world disarmed under effective international control, where disputes would be settled in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

To attain this objective the Western plan encompasses two parallel efforts: one to control and reduce armaments, the other to strengthen peace-keeping machinery. The plan calls for progressive disarmament measures which must be mutually binding and adequately inspected.

As a practical beginning we aim at arms control measures to reduce the risks of war by miscalculation and to end the unregulated diffusion of nuclear weapons. For many months negotiation about one such measure—a suspension of nuclear tests—has been under way. If it should be successfully concluded, a significant step toward limiting the further spread of nuclear capabilities will have been achieved. But this is not enough. We further seek prompt agreement—and the sooner the better—on measures to reduce the risk of war by miscalculation, on safeguards against surprise attack, on measures to forestall weapons activity in outer space, and on an inspected halt to the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. We recognize that such measures would not drastically curtail existing armed forces. But they would stop the arms buildup and would reduce the danger of global war.

Once a lid has been placed on the presently accelerating arms race, we should push on to far-reaching measures of controlled disarmament. Armed forces should be reduced to levels required only for internal security, and weapons of mass destruction should be eliminated. No nation or group of nations could then defy the organized will and purpose of the world community.

Parallel to the measures for safeguarded arms reduction, we aim for the development within the United Nations framework of a system of universally recognized international law, and of international machinery for the enforcement of such law and for the settlement of disputes arising under it. This would require an international force capable of determining aggression. Certainly this nation will not disarm across the board unless we are assured that an international body is in being to preserve the peace.

These, then, are the ways we seek to advance toward the ultimate goal of a more orderly world.

The task will not be an easy one. A look at Chairman Khrushchev's disarmament plan, which constitutes the basis of the Soviet bloc position in the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference, makes this clear. It is, in fact, not a plan at all but a broad statement of objectives—Communist objectives. Arms control and reduction measures are covered in sweeping generalities. No concrete provisions are made for verification and control arrangements. Nor is there any provision for policing the peace in a world devoid of arms.

No Quick Solutions Available

We Americans are impatient. We want quick, complete solutions. But no such solutions are available for today's international problems. Only a world assured of reasonable stability, order, and justice under law can serve the interests of our country and of all peoples.

Such a world cannot be built overnight. Yet unless we make progress toward it we may reach a point of no return. We shall strive toward its realization—through the U.N., through our disarmament negotiations, through other negotiations with the Soviet Union, through all the far-flung efforts of our people at home and abroad in the fields of defense, of foreign trade and investment, of development assistance, of cultural relations, of personal contacts and diplomacy.

To succeed, we will need to do more in all these fields. It is only through our united efforts as a nation that we can hope to advance our best interests in the era of rugged competition that lies ahead.

We are now engaged in a deliberate effort as a nation to influence the forces of history on a world-wide scale. Ambitious though such a task may be, we have no alternative. For unless the rapidly changing world environment is shaped toward a new era of general freedom and prosperity and of universal order and law, neither the United States nor any other free nation can live safely—or perhaps even survive.

Our awareness of these truths drives home a sobering realization of what is required of each one of us. Our national achievement can be only the sum total of our accomplishments as individuals. The Government at Washington has no power or capacity independent of the people who make up this nation.

This is no time for easy living, for lax standards, or for personal pursuit of material benefits at the expense of the Nation's interest. I appeal to all Americans to demonstrate again that revolutionary zeal and ardor that won our independence, that saved our national unity, that drove Ameri-

cans on to conquer the wilderness and create a great civilization. We are called upon today, almost literally, to help create a new world.

This is a task to inspire all Americans and enlist their dedicated efforts, today and in the years to come.

The Approach to the Summit

by Andrew H. Berding

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs¹

It is always a pleasure to me to talk with an organization that not only has an interest in foreign affairs but also does something about it. The fourth objective of Rotary—"the advancement of international understanding, good will and peace through a world fellowship of business and professional men united in the ideal of service"—cannot be commended too highly. But even more important is the fact that you electrify this ideal through action. The more than 1,000 students you have sent from some 65 countries to more than 40 countries to pursue graduate studies are now aiding you in achieving your ideal. We have known many of these students, some of whom have entered our Foreign Service. They give evidence of superior training and devotion, thanks to the Rotary Foundation Fellowship Program.

Having in mind your established interest in foreign affairs and your membership in well over 100 countries and other areas, I know you will bear with me when I speak today solely on foreign affairs, and also when I concentrate on one major imminent development in foreign affairs.

Three weeks from Monday the eyes of the world will turn to Paris. There President Eisenhower, President de Gaulle, and Prime Minister Macmillan will begin meeting with Soviet Chairman Khrushchev. About 3,000 representatives of news,

radio, and TV organizations will cover the summit.

This conference brings together four leaders who have already carried out on their own during the past year an unprecedented series of top-level visits to one another.

The Paris meeting comes about because the United States, along with its allies, believes that international problems should be solved by negotiation, not by force. President Eisenhower has often expressed his willingness to go anywhere, at any time, if he could thereby further the cause of peace.

You know the who and the when of the summit. Now for the why and the what.

Why Negotiate?

The question as to the why is often asked in this way:

Why should the leaders of France, Britain, and the United States meet with Mr. Khrushchev? Cannot negotiations with the Soviets be conducted at a level which does not involve the President?

Why is there any point in negotiating with Mr. Khrushchev, who says that the ultimate objective of the Soviet Union remains unchanged—the triumph of communism over capitalism?

Why should we negotiate new agreements with the Soviets in view of the fact they have broken so many agreements in the past?

¹ Address made before the district conference of Rotary International at Atlantic City, N.J., on Apr. 23 (press release 210).

Before answering these questions, let me emphasize that the United States and our allies are going to the summit conference constructively, with the hope of making a contribution to world peace. The Paris meeting stems from the invitation extended to Chairman Khrushchev in December by Presidents Eisenhower and de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan.²

The reason we believe it may be fruitful to meet at the summit level is that Mr. Khrushchev has repeatedly made it clear that the real decisions for the Soviet Union are taken at his level—not below. If that is the case—we have no reason to doubt it—we must seek to see through personal diplomacy if Mr. Khrushchev is willing to make decisions with us.

As to whether there is any point in negotiating with Mr. Khrushchev, that remains to be seen; but we would be remiss if we did not try. The process of diplomacy is one of patient searching for the key to stubborn disputes. When two nations, or groups of nations, are deadlocked and no possibility appears to exist for resolving the deadlock, it is the task of diplomacy to leave no grain of sand unturned in the search for any honorable approach that may offer a possibility for eventual agreement. Such searching may last for years. In the end, however, it may yield results. Therefore the obligation that lies upon those who seek to establish a just and lasting peace is to keep up the search, patiently and painstakingly, never losing hope that eventually the goal will be reached.

The issues on which the leaders will be negotiating at Paris are longstanding ones. They have been the subject of many, many meetings since the end of the war. And, following all these meetings, they still remain problems. It would consequently be naive to believe that, in a relatively brief meeting at the summit, these issues could be settled once and for all. Obviously, that is not going to be the case.

The ultimate objective of the Soviets—the triumph of the Communist bloc over the free world—does indeed remain unchanged. Mr. Khrushchev himself, during and after his visit to the United States, has frankly and repeatedly proclaimed this objective. But their tactics for achieving

this triumph seem to have altered. They appear to have given up, for the time being at least, the thought of reaching their goal through military means. They appear to be concentrating instead on political, economic, and psychological means. They give an impression of wanting to reduce tensions.

A summit meeting therefore may be eminently useful in probing the sincerity and extent of the Soviets' expressed desire to begin to settle some outstanding issues with the Western allies. There is always the chance that, through a long process of evolution of their thinking, the Soviet rulers may eventually abandon their dream of dominating all other peoples and concentrate on improving the lot of their own people.

I now come to the third question I posed: Since the Soviet Union has broken many agreements, why negotiate new ones?

The answer is that we are willing to negotiate not just any kind of agreement with the Soviet Union but only two kinds. One is the type whose execution can be controlled through inspection. Examples would be safeguarded disarmament and suspension of nuclear testing. By insisting on adequate inspection we can rely on something more solid than Soviet good faith to see that such conventions are carried out faithfully. The second is the type of agreement whose execution is controlled through reciprocity. An example is our cultural exchanges agreement with the Soviets. This is so designed that the exchanges in various categories are made to depend upon mutual action. If the Soviets do not carry out their part of a given exchange we do not have to carry out our part. Thus far this agreement, now more than 2 years old, has worked very well indeed.

The best kind of agreement, of course, is one so conceived that both sides find it in their own best interests to observe it. This is the kind the United States seeks to reach with other nations.

What To Negotiate?

As to the question of the *what* at the summit, there is no fixed agenda. But the major subjects to be discussed come under three headings: disarmament, Germany including Berlin, and East-West relations.

On these major topics we and our allies will be well prepared. The Western foreign ministers

² For an exchange of messages between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev, see BULLETIN of Jan. 18, 1960, p. 77.

conference held in Washington last week was eminently successful in reaching common positions.³ Two more foreign ministers meetings will be held prior to the summit to discuss the Western points in further detail. There is no doubt that, when the summit opens, the Western participants will be united on firm but reasonable positions.

But they will face one major difficulty which it is well to appreciate to the full. And the peoples of the world will also face one major difficulty in understanding what goes on at the summit which it is likewise well to appreciate to the full.

This is the fact that in the Soviet Union we face no normal member of the international community. The Soviet leaders operate on the conviction that theirs is the best political, economic, and social system of organizing human society. They believe it is historically destined to supersede all other forms of human organization in the world. They believe they are acting on the mandate of history when they actively promote the absorption of other countries in the Soviet type of Communist system. Thus, when the Western leaders sit down at the summit table they are faced by Soviet chiefs who claim to possess universally applicable doctrines and supposedly scientific truths which only they are fully capable of interpreting and applying.

The frame of reference within which these Soviet leaders conduct their affairs is thus unlike our own. Even though the words we speak are often the same, the meaning is frequently quite different. This is particularly true when we deal in generalities, as is often the case in international conferences.

The Question of Disarmament

The discussion of disarmament at the summit comes after 14 years of sustained Western effort toward agreement which has been frustrated by Soviet obstruction. The United States and its allies have worked unceasingly to attain practical measures of disarmament ever since the end of the war. We have put forward concrete plan after plan, beginning with the Baruch plan of 1946 on atomic disarmament, in an effort to find common ground with the Soviets.

Over much of this time the Soviet leadership has been addicted to high-sounding slogans. The sweep of their pronouncements has generally not

been backed by a willingness to act so that equitable, safeguarded agreements can ensue.

Here we have had two basic problems. First, the Soviet leaders have persistently put forward broad generalities such as "ban the bomb," "abolish overseas bases," or, currently, "general and complete disarmament." Many of these slogans have been clearly designed to impel unilateral sacrifices by the free world. These include the dissolution of our defense arrangements with other free countries and the curtailment of our nuclear deterrent without commensurate reductions in Soviet military power.

Some Soviet proposals are plainly fraudulent since, even with modern technology, they are incapable of implementation. Thus for years the Soviets have demanded the "abolition of nuclear stockpiles" while they themselves admit that nuclear weapons can be hidden so that no known detection system can find them.

The Soviets have organized enormous propaganda and agitation campaigns—mass meetings, signatures to petitions, letterwriting campaigns—around their slogans while at the same time refusing to engage in an exploration of how a concrete beginning might be made to end the arms race.

The second problem has been the extreme Soviet sensitivity on the inspection issue. For years Soviet disarmament proposals have proclaimed devotion to effective control. Yet when we get down to concrete cases we are confronted with repeated Soviet refusals to consider specifics until the "principles" are agreed. When we make practical suggestions to reduce the danger of war by miscalculation, to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons, and to end the arms race, they counter with allegations that we merely seek to introduce espionage agents into Soviet territory or to get better target information for our Strategic Air Command. Thus they surround the negotiations with an atmosphere of suspicion and polemics scarcely conducive to success.

The Western participants at the disarmament conference at Geneva have asked the Soviet representatives to study with us eight sets of specific, concrete steps⁴ which, if implemented, would put us a long way on the road toward the ultimate goal of a peaceful world. Yet our proposal to prevent the placing of nuclear weapons into outer-

³ *Ibid.*, May 2, 1960, p. 683.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1960, p. 512.

space orbit is met by the evasive response that we should worry about weapons on earth. Our proposal to give advance notification of missile launchings and to provide information on the locations of missile sites—a proposal designed to reduce the danger of war by misinterpretation of another country's intentions—is met by the allegation that this is control without disarmament, an intelligence-gathering scheme. And they say this will increase the danger of war because the side that is informed in advance of the other's intended action might be tempted to take preventive action.

There is not a single proposal that the Western Powers have made at Geneva thus far which the Soviets have not answered in this fashion. It is impossible not to conclude that this constitutes a refusal to grapple with the nuts-and-bolts issues of this admittedly complex problem.

There is good reason to believe that Chairman Khrushchev does want a disarmament agreement. This is for two reasons. One is that he has undoubtedly come to comprehend the risks of war inherent in a continued arms race and to visualize the horrible destruction that war would bring with it. The other is that he is committed to making a monument to himself of economic development in the Soviet Union—he has often boasted that the Soviet Union would overtake the United States in production. And he hopes that this economic development will help bring about the eventual Communist domination of the world. Therefore he would like to transfer to this objective much of the manpower and materiel now devoted to arms and armies.

But at the same time he would like to get disarmament at the cheapest possible price, namely, a minimum of inspection. He would like to keep as much as possible of the present Soviet advantage of military secrecy. And he would like to obtain the last ounce of propaganda advantage from each disarmament development.

We on our side will never give up on our insistence that disarmament be accompanied by reliable control and verification. We do this because history has taught that totalitarian states are always ready to sign general statements full of ringing phrases and lofty sentiments but that they will observe such agreements only so long as it suits their purposes. When they believe they can get away with it—when, in Communist phraseology, the “objective situation changes”—they tear up

such agreements with no compunction, calling them “scraps of paper.”

Meantime we will continue, with our allies, to remain strong and alert. Our defensive alliances will continue effective. And we are confident that the allied peoples will not be lulled into a sense of false security by Soviet propaganda on “peaceful coexistence,” which is just another phrase for continuance of the cold war. Nor will they be incited by Soviet propaganda into pressuring their governments to reduce those defense efforts which are necessitated precisely because of Soviet behavior.

The Question of Germany, Including Berlin

As the Western leaders approach the summit they face a similar problem of finding common understanding on the subject of Germany, including Berlin.

The Soviets say they are in favor of a peace-loving, democratic, independent, and unified Germany. Mr. Khrushchev has proclaimed the principle of self-determination for all peoples. Under these circumstances, and interpreting Soviet statements by the standards of free societies, the solution of the problem of a divided Germany would appear simple enough. By applying the principle of self-determination, the German people, in both Eastern and Western Germany, could be given an opportunity to express through free elections their desires on reunification.

Experience has shown, however, that by Soviet definition only countries governed by Communist regimes subservient to Moscow can be “peace-loving, democratic, and independent.” But we know that the Communist regime in East Germany was imposed by the Soviets. It has never dared face the people it rules in free, secret elections.

When the Soviet leaders utter lofty aims respecting Germany's future, they are in fact demanding the continued subjugation of the 17 million people of East Germany. What is more, they are seeking to have the same system extended to the free people of the independent and truly democratic Federal Republic of Germany, the partner of the Western community.

With such an approach it is perhaps small wonder that the Soviets persistently reject the very basis on which the West believes German freedom and unity must be founded—free elections. For

they know that if the people of Eastern Germany could express themselves freely and without fear of retaliation, they would overwhelmingly vote to rid themselves of the Communist dictatorship that oppresses them.

From this fear of the free expression of the popular will stems the Soviet position that the only way in which progress can be made toward German unity is through negotiations on an equal basis between the puppet government they have set up in Eastern Germany and the freely elected Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. They have no intention, of course, of permitting the East German regime, which is under their control, to enter into arrangements that might endanger that control. A meeting such as they propose would be, in fact, not between the two parts of Germany but between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union.

The Western Powers say that the four major powers with treaty responsibilities in Germany—that is, France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the United States—are responsible for the reunification of Germany on the basis of free elections. That was agreed to in the summit conference in 1955.⁵

The Soviets, however, seek to obtain a propaganda gain now by saying, no, the responsibility for the reunification of Germany is solely that of the German people themselves. But when we ask them what they mean by the German people they say, the governments of East and West Germany. Their proposal for Germans "to sit around one table" is merely intended to obtain prestige and recognition for their East German puppets, who in turn would be emboldened by such recognition to frustrate even more the will of the Germans under their control. While professing to favor reunification, the Soviets perpetuate partition.

The United States will continue to press at the summit and elsewhere for the reunification of Germany. This is a fundamental American policy, and it is likewise the policy of our allies. We believe that the division of Germany is a cruel injustice to the German people and a continuing threat to peace in Europe.

The problem is how to convince the Soviet leaders—who may believe that a divided Germany is essential for their national security—that the reun-

ification of Germany could be an essential element of a working and durable European security system which, in turn, would be an effective guarantee of the Soviet Union's national security.

The problem of a divided Berlin is part of the problem of a divided Germany. Reunification of Germany is the only method for a lasting solution for Berlin. The President and Chairman Khrushchev agreed last September at Camp David⁶ that negotiations should be resumed on Berlin, and we are indeed prepared to negotiate. But any agreement reached as to West Berlin must preserve the freedom of its 2¼ million people and their right of self-determination.

As we approach the summit the Soviets have tried to use Germany as a means of dividing the allies. Many hostile attacks have come from Chairman Khrushchev and other Soviet sources accusing the Federal Republic of Germany of being militaristic and seeking to stir up old enmities between Germany and other countries. These attempts have failed. The community of views and interests between Germany and the three Western Powers which will participate in the summit was again manifested at the Western foreign ministers conference in Washington last week. As the Western leaders discuss with Mr. Khrushchev the problem of a divided Germany, the United States is convinced that the Federal Republic of Germany, under the dedicated leadership of Chancellor Adenauer, has proven itself in every way a reliable ally and friend.

The Question of East-West Relations

The final subject scheduled for the summit—East-West relations—is something of a catchall. We cannot be sure what actually may be discussed under this heading, but we will be prepared for any subjects that may logically be raised.

One major contribution, however, that the Soviet Union could make to the betterment of East-West relations would be the application to the countries of Eastern Europe of the principle of self-determination already proclaimed by Chairman Khrushchev with regard to other countries.

We recall the fact that at Yalta in 1945 Stalin agreed that as early as possible governments should be established in Eastern Europe respon-

⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 176.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Oct. 12, 1959, p. 499.

sive to the will of those peoples. The Soviets have since prevented realization of this goal.

We have sought to make it clear to the Soviets that we are interested only in true self-government in Eastern European countries, the right of every people to choose the government and social system under which it wishes to live. We are not interested in turning these countries against the Soviet Union.

We are interested in better relations between the Western countries and the Soviet Union, and we believe that one means of helping to bring this about would be to give the countries of Eastern Europe national independence.

Mr. Chairman, we approach the summit conference with a sense of realism based on experience. We hope for progress, at least in the direction of obtaining a clearer idea of whether the Soviets are really ready to negotiate seriously and in good faith with us. But we cherish no illusions. We know that the issues between the Soviet bloc and the free world are deep. They will not be settled in one comparatively brief meeting, no matter at what level.

Our realization of the nature of Soviet motivations, and our determination that they shall not succeed in their aims, do not, however, relieve us of the necessity of constantly exploring the possibilities for reaching agreements which will serve the cause of peace. The free world has succeeded in the past in making limited progress along this path. We owe it to ourselves and to all men who want peace to continue our effort, warily, patiently, and constructively.

Letters of Credence

Turkey

The newly appointed Ambassador of Turkey, Melih Esenbel, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on April 22. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 205 dated April 22.

North American Broadcasting Agreement Enters Into Force

Press release 201 dated April 20

The North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA),¹ signed at Washington on November 15, 1950, entered into force on April 19, 1960. The NARBA was signed by plenipotentiaries of the United States, the United Kingdom for the territories in the North American region (Bahamas and Jamaica), Canada, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic.

On February 23, 1960, the U.S. Senate gave advice and consent to ratification of the NARBA. The U.S. instrument of ratification, signed by the President on March 9, 1960, was deposited with the Canadian Government, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, on April 4, 1960. Instruments of ratification had been deposited previously by Cuba (February 7, 1953) and Canada (April 9, 1957).

It is provided in the NARBA that it shall enter into force on the 15th day after the date on which instruments of ratification or adherence have been deposited by at least three of the following four countries, namely, Canada, Cuba, Mexico, and the United States of America. Accordingly, the agreement entered into force on April 19, 1960, the 15th day after the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification.

The NARBA is the third of a series of agreements between countries in the North American region designed to govern the international aspects of standard (AM) radio broadcasting in the region. The purpose is to make it possible for the countries parties to the agreement to make the most effective technical use of the radio frequency bands available for such broadcasting, with a minimum of interference between stations of the several countries, within a framework of international stability.

¹ S. Ex. A, 82d Cong., 1st sess.

National and International Science

by Wallace R. Brode

*Science Adviser to the Secretary of State*¹

Whether the title is "Science, Government, and Society," "The Role of Science in Foreign Policy," "The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution," "The Scientist in Politics: On Top or on Tap," or "International Science," the theme represents a concern over the lack of integration between science and other elements of our culture. These few titles cited are typical of the great wealth of writing and lecturing emanating from the free world on this broad problem.

Comparable discussions have not been evident in the Soviet press; and [Yevgeniy K.] Federov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences has lamented the scarcity of public exposition by Soviet scientists on the political implications of scientific developments. He pointed out to his colleagues at the annual meeting of the Soviet Academy last year that such participation and contributions by Soviet scientists would not be difficult because they do not have to maneuver between the Government position and scientific objectivity. He indicated that their position has been defined or brought to life by their Government and the noble task of presenting these views is an honor for the Soviet scientist to undertake.

In contrast, in our country free discussions have promoted action in our Government rather than always serving as an exposition of previously determined governmental positions. There have been created scientific agencies such as the National Institutes of Health, the National Science

Foundation, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The placing of scientists in key positions—such as Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, who serves as the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; Dr. Herbert F. York, Director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense; Dr. Roy C. Newton, Coordinator for Utilization Research, Department of Agriculture; Dr. James H. Wakelin, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, and others—as well as my own position in the Department of State—reflects a strengthening of the role of science in the Government. In the work of our Science Office in the Department of State we have created a Science Office in Washington and placed science officers in 10 of our embassies abroad. These science officers provide a major avenue of entry of scientific concepts into our foreign policy, and simultaneously a mechanism is provided by which our foreign policy concepts may be transmitted to our scientific community.

The two committees which Dr. Kistiakowsky chairs, the President's Science Advisory Committee, composed of nongovernment scientists, and the Federal Council for Science and Technology, composed of governmental administrators, exert a strong impact on relating science to other aspects of our Government. Conferences on nuclear test detection, atoms for peace, law of the sea, Antarctica, and telecommunication—all include legal, scientific, economic, and political aspects, and United States scientists actively participate in the consideration of these problems.

In this combination of science and other concepts there is a balance which must be achieved;

¹ Address made before the American Chemical Society at Cleveland, Ohio, on Apr. 9. Dr. Brode was awarded the Priestley Medal, the highest award of the Society, "on the basis of his distinguished service to chemistry as a teacher, in research, in administration, as a contributor to the development of chemistry by his many activities in many professional societies, and as a public servant."

science should join with other elements of our culture so that integrated national and foreign policies will result. While we scientists are generally willing to concede that science should influence our national policy, it is often more difficult for us to admit that our national policy should also influence our science programs. Because the political division of the world places national governments in a more dominating position with respect to citizens than an international coordinating body, so in science the national scientific societies and their publications, abstracts, and exchange programs predominate over an international science program. The extent of engagement in international meetings and activities as compared with national society activity and direct exchange by scientists is definitely limited, both by relative importance of such activity and the impediment of languages, finance, travel, national barriers, and political complications.

Relationship of International to U.S. Science

What is international science? What is its relationship to U.S. science? Actually the position of the United States in science on the international scene is essentially a reflection of our developments at the national level, and our developments at the national level have as one of their mainstays our national science organization activities. For example, in the field of chemistry no international organization begins to approach the force, activity, or contribution which our American Chemical Society makes to the promotion of chemistry, either with respect to activities within this nation or the contact and dissemination of knowledge and research to other nations.

The two primary modes of furthering scientific advances are, first, publication or written communication and, second, the spoken word as in technical papers presented at meetings. There are some 40,000 foreign subscriptions to our American Chemical Society journals and some 6,000 foreign members of the American Chemical Society. The figure of 40,000 foreign subscriptions to our American Chemical Society journals does not include an estimated 10,000 photo-offset copies issued by the Soviets for their scientists. To a degree we provide Soviet science literature to our scientists, but we are handicapped by the need for translation and the attendant printing cost. This meeting of the American Chemical Society, if up to our average, will probably gather

6,000 to 8,000 scientists to hear more than 1,000 technical papers, most of which will be abstracts of papers to be subsequently published in detail.

National scientific societies such as the American Chemical Society must assume a major role in promotion of both national and international science just as separate governments lead in intergovernmental organizations. International programs in science will not supplant national programs except perhaps in some special cases where a regional operation is preferable, such as UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] or WHO [World Health Organization]. International science programs should utilize national or regional programs. The international usage of the regions of the Antarctic, outer space, and the oceans rests on informal cooperative research between scientists of many nations and formal agreements between the separate nations.

We as scientists, and as chemists in particular, are well acquainted with our national science organization, yet it must be obvious that our difficulty sometimes in naming the officers or the location of the secretariat of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry indicates that the role which international science plays in technical activity at the individual level is relatively low compared with national science activities. It is of course to be recognized that we are today engaged in more international activity than in previous generations. The International Geophysical Year was an outstanding success, and it is hoped that there will be an increase in this kind of international scientific activity; but it must also be recognized that the producers, supporters, and consumers of this type of international activity are still organized on a national basis. Recognition of this fact in no way deters those who promote international scientific activity but rather acknowledges that national science is an essential constituent in our international science programs.

We have as a nation been undergoing a continuous growth and evolution accompanied by policy changes in our foreign relations. In fact, policies and programs must be adaptable and changeable to meet the challenge of these changes without deviating from our long-range objectives. With the incorporation of scientists and the science viewpoint into our policy planning, it has been possible to develop and adapt policies to meet the special needs of science.

National policies must be adjusted to meet and either oppose or support the policies of other nations and thus create international policies. Each nation may have essentially the same basic policy as we have, yet directed toward their interest. Our basic policy is to maintain a government which upholds the high ideals of the people of the United States.

Our policies on international meetings, foreign travel, and exchange of publications are all designed to promote to the fullest extent possible, consistent with the best interests of the United States, international science meetings in the United States; to encourage and support travel of United States scientists abroad to attend such meetings; and to support the widest exchange of published scientific material by subsidy and collection. Procedures have been established by which waivers are provided to foreign scientists for attendance at meetings in this country who would otherwise be excluded by law. Science is promoted and supported by many and various special exceptions, waivers, financial support, special attachés, and advisers.

In the latest listing of international scientific meetings, published by the Library of Congress for a projected 3 years, some 825 international scientific and technical meetings are scheduled. The list includes many regional groups, such as European societies, but does not include strictly American society meetings such as those of the American Chemical Society, which may be many times larger with more foreign attendees. However, 115 of the listed 825 meetings are scheduled to be held in the United States, whereas only 12 meetings are listed in the schedule for the Soviet Union in this same period.

Contribution of Scientists to National Programs

There has been in recent years a marked improvement in the free flow of scientific information and data to and from our Nation, and much of this improvement can be credited to the campaign which scientists, and in particular Walter Murphy in the *Chemical and Engineering News*, waged for the revision of regulations controlling the export of technical data. This is just another illustration of scientists participating in the development of policy to promote our national scientific programs.

Special scientific committees contribute to formulation of various aspects of our foreign aid

program in African, Asian, and South American areas. Because some Government agencies concerned have recognized the necessity for continuous and internal scientific advice, a scientific staff is often added to their organizations. Thus scientists employed by the Government have been providing scientific viewpoints in such deliberations as conferences on law of the sea and telecommunications. The fact that scientists have been recruited by Government agencies to assist in developing our policy positions should not be interpreted as a deterrent to other scientists to present their views. The gathering of these viewpoints is part of the governmental scientists' role. In other words, a true integration of science with other elements of our culture in governmental policy represents an appraisal of separate scientific positions, whether they be academic, industrial, or institutional, and an appropriate incorporation of these into our national policy.

In a recent debate between a Member of our Senate and a European scientist on the general subject of whether a scientist should engage in rendering political decisions, there was quite a difference of opinion. The expressed view of the Senator was that scientists should refrain from political activities and leave these to the seasoned and experienced politician. The scientist, however, maintained that the scientists had just as much right as anyone to delve into politics. What was missing from this discussion was the recognition that there is a need for people trained in both natural and political sciences in order to make wise decisions in this age when science should be an integral and interdependent part of our national policy promotion.

Scientists have an opportunity and a responsibility today, which is greater than ever before, to become leaders in a new concept of national government and world cooperation. It should be recognized that this would require an integrated program of the natural sciences with the economic, social, psychological, and political sciences. This does not mean that natural science would simply be a tool of the other sciences; it also does not mean that natural science would override considerations of the other sciences. It does mean an honest effort of those concerned to develop a tolerance, an understanding, and a will to work toward this unified outlook.

Those who would separate science and scientists from our national policies and responsibilities

have sometimes done so in order to disavow responsibility when actions are taken which are contrary to our governmental policies. Any individual listed as officially representing the United States, whether he is a scientist or not, has a responsibility to support his Government's policies on all issues which may arise at the forum where he has official status. If on peripheral issues the scientist has personal views in conflict with his Government's policy, it should be incumbent upon him, so long as he accepts official responsibility, to present his Government's position on these peripheral matters and to refrain from any action which would negate that position.

It is reasonable to assume that there are areas of foreign policy in which scientists' influence in policy formation or administration should be comparable to that of the nonscientific citizen, but as the subject becomes more scientific in character the specialized competence of the scientist should exert a greater influence. Under such a planned program it would appear that the policies thus determined should in fact be acceptable to the scientist as guidelines to his operation in national and international programs.

Coordination of Science and National Policy

The separation of science from other elements of our society is about as impossible as separating basic from applied research. Our science officer in Bonn, Germany, Professor Ludwig F. Audrieth (who is on a leave of absence from the Department of Chemistry of the University of Illinois), has in an excellent appraisal indicated,

I would make a strong plea for a position that so-called fundamental research must be objective and not merely dedicated to an increase of the world's sum total of knowledge. If the theoretical pronouncements of science cannot eventually find application in the betterment of human life, such knowledge is barren and unproductive. I believe that it is unwise for us to continually emphasize fundamental research and not to take into consideration the accomplishments which derive from application. Fundamental research and development are both part of the whole spectrum of science and technology as applied to modern life. Education, research, development, production and usage constitute overlapping areas; each cultural area has a stimulating effect on the other phases of a total cyclical process. We cannot afford to differentiate, rather we should make an effort to integrate basic science with applied programs within a total process.

However, in the U.S.S.R. the president and vice president of the Academy of Science, [Aleksandr

N.] Nesmeyanov and [Aleksandr V.] Topchiyev, in the annual Academy report of last year have carried this theme of coordination of basic science, applied science, and national policy to an extreme in that only those science programs which further the Communist Party's aim are promoted.

Nesmeyanov said:

The chief task lies in sharply intensifying the response of science to the country, to its national economy, to its culture, and in increasing the effectiveness of scientific research operations by concentrating them in the most important directions.

Topchiyev said:

The party teaches us that when tasks have been determined, it is necessary first of all to organize our forces in such a way as to solve the tasks placed before us with a minimum expenditure of resources and with maximum effectiveness. The new increase of research works in decisive sectors of science will require a fundamental reorganization of the Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R., and its institutions. The reorganization of the Academy must guarantee that scientific work is brought closer to the demands of life. . . .

Topchiyev presented a priority list of 30 most important problems to be studied and solved. In the area of chemistry items included were: study and creation of new semiconductor materials; chemistry of high-molecular compounds; the creation of a general theory of the structure and properties of polymers, and the search for principles and methods of producing rubber, fibers, and plastics of a given structure and a given set of chemical and physicochemical properties; starting and auxiliary substances for the conversion of petroleum, gas, and mineral raw material; chemistry of natural and biologically important compounds; research on the structure and properties of proteins, carbohydrates, and nucleotides; production of new effective antibiotics (primarily anticancer and antiviral); synthesis of new vitamins, enzymes, and medicines; metals and alloys (primarily zirconium, niobium, tantalum, beryllium, germanium, lithium, selenium, and tellurium); radiochemistry, the chemical action of penetrating radiation, the use of isotopes; natural laws governing distribution of most important mineral resources in the earth's crust; biochemistry, technical biochemistry, and photosynthesis.

It should be recognized that, whereas most of these programs can be directed toward development of peaceful scientific advances, they can also be applied for military or economic purposes and a concentrated effort devoted to this limited list

of projects could with reasonable accomplishment lead to higher prestige to the Soviet science program and to its stated national economy objectives. The concentration of effort and the proposed reorganization of Soviet science to achieve these chemical goals (as well as similar physical, biological, engineering, and social programs) demonstrates the dedicated way in which the Soviets are pursuing their objectives.

In contrast are we in this nation considering the extent of planning essential for long-range science programs and also successful national and foreign policies? We are certainly moving toward such planning in our legislative studies and agency planning, but our many varied agencies and organizations in science and technology in governmental, state, private, and industrial areas require a careful and well-conceived plan of operation.

Our free-world nations have made advances toward the strengthening of science in their governmental organization. Great Britain has recently created a ministry for science. Cabinet-level or near-cabinet-level status to science has been established by France, Belgium, Canada, South Africa, Japan, and other nations.

Last December, in addressing the American Association for the Advancement of Science, I cited the need for planning our science program at the national level and suggested the creation of a commission to study this problem. It would be my hope that such a commission would develop suggestions for coordination of our national science program. I am not recommending that the solution should be a department of science, a commission, institution, or foundation. Rather I am recommending that we face up to and handle the problem of creating a proper position for science in our national policy and operation.

There are many implementing policies and activities which are promoted by our Government, societies, and individual citizens which are planned or performed with a feeling that these actions are in consonance with our basic policy. We may, however, find that some activities or programs conflict with each other, may not in fact be in our best interest. In such cases there may well be a need for a reorientation or program change. The increasing penetration of science and technology into our national lives is a two-way effect depending on which area of the "two cultures" one inhabits. A fusion is to be encour-

aged and supported, for there must be an acceptance of the interdependence of science and national policies. Each includes portions of the other, and both are directed and supported by our basic policy of furthering the best ideals of our country. It is essential that our science program represent a balance between national and international efforts which will simultaneously preserve national and free-world ideals, security, and prestige and promote worldwide cultural advances. The United States position and prestige in the world of science is dependent on our doing good work in science, publishing our results, and giving our scientists adequate recognition for their accomplishments.

U.S. and Canada To Hold Talks on Wilderness Preserves

White House press release dated April 12

The White House announced on April 12 that arrangements have been made for informal consultations to take place between the President's Quetico-Superior Committee and a similar committee which is being created by the Prime Minister of Ontario, Leslie M. Frost. The objective of these consultations is the adoption of similar policies for the administration of the wilderness preserves maintained on both sides of the United States-Canada border by the U.S. Government and the government of Ontario.

The chairman of the President's Quetico-Superior Committee is Charles S. Kelly of Chicago.

Members of the Quetico-Superior Committee appointed by President Eisenhower will meet intermittently with a committee named by Prime Minister Frost of the Canadian Province of Ontario to develop coordinated plans for the parks area. The Department of State and the Canadian Department of External Affairs assisted in the negotiations. Members of both committees will meet from time to time to review administrative matters relating to their respective sections of the area. These consultations will be made known to the two Governments.

The two areas concerned are both set aside as wilderness recreation zones and form a natural geographic unit. They have strong historic interest, as the old *voyageurs'* canoe route to the West goes through the heart of the country along the international boundary line.

The Ontario portion of the area still contains much virgin country. On the United States side there has been a restoration program under way for several years. To date some \$1.5 million have been spent restoring to wilderness a million-acre tract along the border. Congress is currently considering appropriating an additional \$1 million for this purpose. There are no public roads in this wilderness region on either side.

The Quetico-Superior area has a continentwide reputation as canoe country. Replete with lakes connected by comparatively short portages, it is renowned among sportsmen, and each year many thousands of them travel through it by canoe.

Proposed Waiver of Cargo Preference Rule on Indus Project Explained

Press release 199 dated April 19

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

As announced in a Department of State press release issued on February 29, 1960,¹ the Government of the United States proposes to participate in the financing of the plan proposed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for settlement of the Indus waters dispute between India and Pakistan. Legislation providing for this participation has been introduced in this session of the Congress as an amendment to the Mutual Security Act. One section of this proposed legislation provides that funds appropriated pursuant to that act might be used without regard to the 50/50 provision of the Cargo Preference Act "whenever the President determines that such provisions cannot be fully satisfied without seriously impeding or preventing accomplishment of such purposes."

On April 5 representatives of the American maritime industry met with Under Secretary Dillon to request that this proposal to authorize waiver of the 50/50 rule insofar as it concerns the Indus basin project be withdrawn. In a letter dated April 6, Ralph E. Casey, president of the Merchant Marine Institute, wrote Mr. Dillon regarding the meeting. In a reply dated April 11, Mr. Dillon explained why the proposed amend-

ment was believed to be important, noting also that a bill containing that amendment had been reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It was his belief, he said, that the executive branch neither should, nor appropriately could, withdraw its request for the amendment. Copies of the two letters are attached.

In a press release issued by the American Merchant Marine Institute on April 15, Mr. Casey described this decision by the Department of State as "merely the latest in a long series of policy decisions under which the American merchant marine is sacrificed needlessly for foreign interests." He further stated that "in this action with respect to the Indus River project we see the initial crack in the foundation upon which American shipping depends for its very existence."

As stated by Under Secretary Dillon in his letter of April 11: "... the Executive Branch has no intention whatsoever of seeking to depart from the established policy set forth in the cargo preference legislation." The proposed authority, Mr. Dillon explained, would be "permissive," and the need for its exercise in the near future was not now foreseen. However, Mr. Dillon pointed out:

... the very fabric of the planning for this project rests upon its multilateral character and upon the voluntary agreement, by all of the contributors to the Indus Basin Development Fund, to refrain from applying to their contributions the national preference requirements—of whatever nature—which would normally govern the use of such funds. Were the United States to apply preferential conditions to its contribution, we could not logically oppose the application of counter-conditions on the contributions of other nations. The welter of conflicting national conditions which might be expected to ensue would complicate the administration of the Indus project to the point where the present proposal would no longer be operable. You will recognize that the amount of time and effort which have been devoted to the achievement of the present solution to the Indus problem have been enormous, and that we may not again be able to arrive at an acceptable solution, should we lose this opportunity.

Having stated why the Department would not wish to attach any condition of preference to the U.S. Indus contribution, Mr. Dillon indicated that:

1. There was no reason to believe that substantial amounts of Indus tonnage would not move on U.S. flag vessels;
2. Should this amount prove to be lower than that required under the cargo-preference legisla-

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 21, 1960, p. 442; see also the President's message to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for fiscal year 1961, *ibid.*, Mar. 7, 1960, p. 369.

tion, it was believed that compensating adjustments in other MSP-financed cargo traffic patterns would obviate the need in the near future to request actual use of the waiver authority; and

3. Even if the program of assistance to South Asia declined substantially, the Department believed that compensating adjustments could hold application of the waiver authority to minimal levels.

In sum, Mr. Dillon concluded:

... we have no intention of departing from the established policy on cargo preference. We will exert every effort to avoid any need to exercise the waiver authority which is sought but we believe its possession would be of significant advantage to the United States Government.

In his press release statement of April 15 Mr. Casey mentioned that the proposed contribution by the United States to the Indus River project amounted to \$515 million out of a total of \$645 million, whereas Great Britain, "whose shipping interests have long been the archenemy of United States maritime policy," would contribute only \$58 million.

In fact, the total cost of the plan evolved by the IBRD is estimated to be in the order of \$1 billion. The sum of \$645 million cited by Mr. Casey is over and above the amounts to be contributed by India and Pakistan and by the Bank itself, the latter amounting to \$103 million. The contribution proposed by the Bank for the United States consists of \$177 million in grant aid, \$103 million in loans, and \$235 million in loans and grants in local currencies to be derived from the operations of various U.S. programs in Pakistan. Since the provisions of 50/50 will already have applied to any commodity shipments under these programs, such as that of surplus agricultural commodities under Public Law 480, the application of 50/50 on \$235 million of the U.S. contribution will already have been assured.

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

Mr. Dillon's Letter to Mr. Casey

APRIL 11, 1960

DEAR MR. CASEY: I refer to your letter of April 6 regarding the meeting with representatives of the maritime industry on April 5 at which we discussed the proposed amendment to the Mutual Security Act relating to the Indus Basin project. I found the meeting helpful also and hope that it clarified the subject for you.

As I stated at the meeting the Executive Branch has no intention whatsoever of seeking to depart from the established policy set forth in the cargo preference legislation. In seeking an amendment relating to the Indus Basin project we have asked for permissive authority whereunder the President could waive the requirements of the cargo preference legislation with respect to this particular project if he found that the provisions of the cargo preference act could not be fully satisfied without seriously impeding or preventing accomplishment of the Indus Basin project.

As we have explained to the Congress and to you and your associates, we do not foresee need to exercise this authority in the near future. If the present programs of assistance under the Mutual Security Act were to continue at approximately present levels over the period of time that will be required to complete the Indus Basin project, we could probably be reasonably confident that no necessity to waive the provisions of the cargo preference legislation would arise.

Yet the fact that we anticipate ability to compensate within the regular Mutual Security Program for the required proportion of the tonnage deriving from implementation from the Indus Basin project may tend to obscure the importance which attaches to the requested authority to waive the requirements of the cargo preference legislation with respect to this particular project. As you are aware, the very fabric of the planning for this project rests upon its multilateral character and upon the voluntary agreement, by all of the contributors to the Indus Basin Development Fund, to refrain from applying to their contributions the national preference requirements—of whatever nature—which would normally govern the use of such funds. Were the United States to apply preferential conditions to its contribution, we could not logically oppose the application of counter-conditions on the contributions of other nations. The welter of conflicting national conditions which might be expected to ensue would complicate the administration of the Indus project to the point where the present proposal would no longer be operable. You will recognize that the amount of time and effort which have been devoted to the achievement of the present solution to the Indus problem have been enormous, and that we may not again be able to arrive at an acceptable solution, should we lose this opportunity. For these reasons, we would not wish

May 9, 1960

to attach any condition of preference to our Indus contribution—although there is no reason to believe that substantial amounts of Indus tonnage would not move on U.S. flag vessels. Should this amount prove to be lower than that required under the cargo preference legislation, we believe that compensating adjustments in other MSP-financed cargo traffic patterns will obviate the need in the near future to request actual use of the waiver authority. Even if the program of assistance to South Asia declines substantially, we believe that compensating adjustments could hold application of the waiver authority to minimal levels.

As you note in your letter the progress of legislation is such that a bill containing the proposed amendment has been reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. I do not believe that the Executive Branch should, nor appropriately could, withdraw its request for this amendment.

Obviously the matter is one for the Congress to determine and it will have to decide whether it wishes to deny the authority sought. I believe that the authority does not seriously threaten the interest of the maritime industry and that the existence of such authority will provide a useful assurance should the contingency arise which requires its exercise in order to accomplish the important purposes sought through the Indus Basin project.

I believe that you and your colleagues do appreciate the significant objectives which the Indus River Basin project would promote. As you know the delay in the solution of this problem has long prejudiced relationships between India and Pakistan. Progress on this project should be of major significance in reducing international tensions as well as providing major economic benefits in South Asia.

In sum, we have no intention of departing from the established policy on cargo preference. We will exert every effort to avoid any need to exercise the waiver authority which is sought but we believe its possession would be of significant advantage to the United States Government.

Sincerely yours,

DOUGLAS DILLON
Under Secretary

Mr. RALPH E. CASEY,
*President, American Merchant Marine Institute,
Inc., 919 18th Street, N.W.,
Washington 6, D.C.*

Mr. Casey's Letter to Mr. Dillon

APRIL 6, 1960

HONORABLE DOUGLAS DILLON
*Under Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington 25, D.C.*

DEAR MR. DILLON:

Subject: Cargo Preference Act—Indus River Basin Project

On behalf of the entire maritime industry, I want to express our appreciation for giving so generously of your valuable time in meeting with us yesterday on problems relating to the Cargo Preference Act's applicability to the Indus Basin project. The thorough discussion which ensued did, I am sure, clarify for our mutual benefit the issues involved.

We were gratified that the Department of State will, as you stated, give serious consideration to withdrawing the waiver provision language contained in section 404 of the Mutual Security bill now being considered by the Congress.

It is our understanding, however, that both on the Senate and the House sides, final markup of this legislation will be completed in the next day or two. May we suggest, therefore, that if time has moved too quickly for the Department to seek withdrawal of the waiver provision at the Committee levels, we would be pleased to arrange for an amendment for this same purpose to be offered from the floor in both the Senate and the House when the bill is under consideration by each of the full bodies. If the Department would inform the floor managers of the bill in both Houses of its desire to accept such an amendment, we feel there will be no difficulty whatever in thus accomplishing this purpose, particularly in light of the fact that, as it developed during the course of our discussion, the waiver provision of section 404 was clearly not at all necessary and certainly not at this time.

In this connection we were pleased to note your intention to adopt administrative measures to alleviate the problem created by the fact that cargo preference controls could not be readily applied to procurement under this project. Thus, in order to make up for this deficiency, it is intended that the annual contribution made by the United States to the Indus Basin project will be considered for computation purposes as a part of the overall Mutual Security contribution to this area, and that cargo preference would be applied to procurement under the total sum. By way of example you indicated—should the U.S. contribution to the Indus Basin project be \$20 million in any one year, and our Mutual Security program to Pakistan be \$80 million, U.S. flag vessels would be assured 50 per cent participation in the total \$100 million program, and not merely 50 per cent participation in the \$80 million program. Such administration of the Cargo Preference Act is entirely feasible, as was indicated at our meeting yesterday.

I want to reassure you that ours is a desire to cooperate with the Department to the fullest extent possible. We feel that once again we have formulated potential solutions to problems mutually acceptable both to our

industry and the Government. If we are given the opportunity in the future for forthright discussion, as was the case at yesterday's meeting, we can reduce to a bare minimum those problems which clearly result from lack of understanding.

Since the matters discussed above require prompt action and a confirmation of our understanding, we would appreciate hearing from you very soon.

Sincerely yours,

RALPH E. CASEY

Don Paarlberg Named Coordinator of Food-for-Peace Program

The White House (Augusta, Ga.) announced on April 13 that the President on that date had appointed Don Paarlberg as Food-for-Peace Coordinator. This is a new post on the President's executive staff. Mr. Paarlberg, who is serving as Special Assistant to the President in the general area of economics, will take over these new duties immediately. He will be located in the White House offices and will report to the President.

Primary objective of the food-for-peace program is the use of our abundant supplies of farm products in meeting the needs of our friends abroad. The Department of Agriculture, working in close cooperation with the Department of State, has major operating responsibility for the program. Various other Departments are involved. Operating responsibility will continue in the executive departments as at present.

The food-for-peace program was first announced by the President on January 29, 1959, in a special message to the Congress on agriculture.¹ At that time the President said:

I am setting steps in motion to explore anew with other surplus-producing nations all practical means of utilizing the various agricultural surpluses of each in the interest of reinforcing peace and the well-being of friendly peoples throughout the world—in short, using food for peace.

A Wheat Utilization Committee, made up of representatives of the United States, Argentina, Australia, Canada, and France, with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations participating as observer-adviser, was established in 1959 to explore ways and means of

carrying out the objectives of food for peace.² Presently a joint mission representing this Committee is completing investigations of various opportunities along this line in the Far East. The mission will return to Washington later this month to prepare a report on its recommendations to the Wheat Utilization Committee.

Chief instrument of the food-for-peace program is Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, recommended by the administration and enacted by the Congress in 1954. This is the major legislative authority for the export movement of surplus farm products outside the normal channels of trade. Last year shipments of farm products under this authority reached the following totals (in terms of cost to the Commodity Credit Corporation):

Export sales for foreign currency	\$1, 195, 000, 000
Donated for meeting disaster abroad	86, 000, 000
Donated to needy persons abroad through charitable institutions	210, 000, 000
Bartered for strategic and critical materials	156, 000, 000
Total	1, 647, 000, 000

In addition, export sales of agricultural products for dollars last year reached a total of \$2,459,000,000.

In his new duties Mr. Paarlberg will expedite interdepartmental decisionmaking and undertake achievement of a better understanding of the program at home and abroad.

Senate Confirms Louis Cabot as U.S. Representative to ECE

The Senate on April 20 confirmed the Executive nomination of Louis Wellington Cabot to be the representative of the United States to the 15th session [Geneva, April 20–May 6] of the Economic Commission for Europe of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. For biographic details, see Department of State press release 189 dated April 13.

¹ For text of a communique issued on May 6, 1959, at the close of a conference of the major wheat-exporting nations, see BULLETIN of June 1, 1959, p. 793.

¹ H. Doc. 59, 86th Cong., 1st sess.

The First Japanese Diplomatic Mission to the United States—1860

by E. Taylor Parks

The date of May 14, 1960, marks the 100th anniversary of the arrival at Washington of the first diplomatic mission that Japan ever sent to another nation. Following the Treaty of Peace and Amity (Perry Treaty) of 1854, the growing desire of the Japanese to enlarge their international contacts and the determination of the American envoy, Townsend Harris, to have his nation again furnish the initiative led to the negotiation of a Treaty of Amity and Commerce on July 29, 1858, which included a provision for the exchange of ratifications at Washington before July 4, 1859. Plans were soon underway to dispatch an impressive embassy to participate in the exchange ceremony. However, the date had to be moved up because of personnel changes in the Japanese "foreign office" and because certain highly placed persons tried persistently to keep the old law prescribing the death penalty for Japanese leaving the homeland. New negotiations (March 19, 1859) approved postponement until early in 1860.

Japan, lacking a suitable vessel to convey the mission, had already requested that the United States furnish a man-of-war for that purpose. Townsend Harris had recommended that the request be granted and had written to Commodore Josiah Tattnall, Flag Officer and Commandant of the U.S. East India Squadron. A certain urgency was introduced into the situation by Lord Elgin's invitation for the Japanese to send a mission to London with all "conveyance" expenses

paid. Harris' delight at Washington's approval of his recommendation is understandable.¹

We were the first nation to make a treaty of amity with the Japanese. This we have followed up by making the first commercial treaty with them, and to have the *éclat* to receive the first embassy from this singular people cannot but redound to our national honor.

In both the Perry Expedition of 1853-54 and the Japanese mission of 1860, the U.S. Navy played a significant role. Admiral Perry negotiated the Treaty of Peace and Amity in Japan; his successors made possible the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce at Washington.

The U.S.S. *Mississippi*, arriving before the embassy was ready to depart, proceeded to another assignment. Commodore Tattnall was then instructed to make the U.S.S. *Powhatan* available. To the accompaniment of lively music and a 17-gun salute, the embassy embarked at Fort Shiba on February 9, 1860. After spending some time on final preparations at Yokohama, the *Powhatan*, under Captain George F. Pearson, set sail on February 13.²

According to Townsend Harris the embassy was headed by Shimmi Buzen-no-Kami, Muragaki Awaji-no-Kami, and Oguri Bungo-no-Kami and consisted of "eighteen Persons of Rank and fifty-three servants"—71 persons.³

The *Powhatan* was loaded to capacity. Several guns had been dismantled so that additional rooms could be constructed on deck to accommodate embassy personnel. Japanese mats had been fitted to the rooms, special galley provided for the Japanese cooks, and generous supplies of food and drink brought aboard. Fifty tons of luggage and gifts completed the cargo—a veritable conglomeration of human beings, personal effects, cattle, sheep, pigs, poultry, champagne, fuel, and

• Mr. Parks is Officer in charge, Research Guidance and Review, Historical Office, Department of State.

some of the finest specimens of Japanese art and handicraft.

As the *Powhatan* cruised along the coast, Japanese fishermen were amazed to see their officials leaving the country aboard a foreign vessel. Scarcely had majestic Fuji disappeared from view before seasickness struck the passengers. There were hectic and stormy days ahead, causing some to wonder who gave the name "Pacific" to such an angry ocean. The Washington birthday banquet had to be postponed 2 days. The daily concerts could be only indifferently enjoyed. Through it all, however, the Japanese were curious and inquisitive about all they saw. They examined everything aboard and questioned the crew almost endlessly. Chaplain Henry Wood conducted English classes, adding some information in the fields of geography and general science—not to mention a proposal for the reading of the Christian Bible.⁴

Heavy weather compelled a change of course via Honolulu for fuel and repairs. A 10-day stop-over there gave the Japanese an opportunity to eat their first bananas, see their first billiard game, and hear their first piano music. The ambassadors were presented to the Hawaiian monarchs, who returned the visit aboard the *Powhatan*. The voyage to San Francisco was pleasant enough, although the travelers seem to have been a little bored by the monotony of ship life.

On March 29 the Japanese were welcomed to San Francisco with flying flags and the appropriate gun salute. The next day they set foot on American soil. Captain Taylor and Commodore Tattnall soon left for Panama and Washington, respectively, to help make arrangements for the visitors aboard the vessel from Panama and in the Nation's Capital.

The ambassadors were delighted to learn that the Japanese escort vessel *Kanrin Maru*, which had sailed a few days before the *Powhatan*, had already arrived at San Francisco and was under repairs at Mare Island. The *Kanrin Maru* was a small sailing craft; it was equipped with an auxiliary steam engine of 100 horsepower for harbor maneuvering but was dependent on sails at sea.

Captain John Mercer Brooke and several American sailors had accompanied the Japanese on the *Kanrin Maru*. The voyage had been so rough that a "quiet dignified meal" had been impossible.

U.S.-Japan Centennial

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have jointly declared 1960 a Centennial Year to commemorate the first Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States. This was announced at the White House on January 19 when President Eisenhower and Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi signed a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in the same room in which President Buchanan had received the first treaty mission 100 years earlier.

An Interagency Committee for the Cultural and Public Affairs Aspects of the U.S.-Japan Centennial, on which are represented 10 U.S. Government agencies and the District of Columbia, is planning a series of events in observance of the anniversary, and a similar committee has been set up in Japan. President Eisenhower will issue a proclamation on the Centennial. He will visit Japan in June, and the Crown Prince and Crown Princess will come to the United States as part of the celebrations in the fall.

The crew of the *Kanrin Maru* was hardly prepared to handle sails in such waters, so the American seamen were "afforded an opportunity of rendering important service." During the 37-day voyage, however, the Japanese greatly improved their seamanship.⁵ The return voyage was made "entirely under Japanese navigators," although a few American sailors were enlisted. The ship had been repaired and new lockers built at Mare Island without charge to the Japanese.

The people of San Francisco were already accustomed to seeing strange people with swords and hemp sandals when the *Powhatan* arrived. The Japanese from both vessels were much impressed with the size of the hotels, the elegance of the furnishings, and the efficiency of the service, secured by the pulling of a wire cord rather than the clapping of hands. The meals were sumptuous enough but too greasy to be savory according to Japanese standards. The ice in the champagne glasses was a real novelty: some swallowed the pieces; other spat them out; still others chewed them.

American dancing appeared to the Japanese merely as "hopping around the room together." It seemed strange to the visitors that at the American theaters persons playing feminine roles were actually women. The local Chinese theatrical efforts were much more appreciated.

The visitors marveled at the transportation system: use of horses instead of men for burden-bearing, carriages instead of sedan chairs.

The reception of the embassy at the City Hall was an elegant affair, preceded by a 17-gun salute from the Plaza which, incidentally, broke some window panes in the City Hall. The reception was followed by a banquet in the "upper chamber" of Job's Saloon, where some 50 people (including 6 Japanese) were treated to "cold turkey, cold game, salads, ice creams, charlotte russe, all manner of dainty confectionery, and champagne." It was reported that the city supervisors, not the taxpayers, picked up the check.⁶

The *Powhatan* resumed its voyage to Panama on April 7, arriving 17 days later. Crossing the Isthmus by train at the "marvelous speed" of 47½ miles in 3 hours on the recently completed Panama Railroad was really a novel experience for the Japanese. They marveled at the "electrical devise" (telegraph) that made possible the transaction of business across the Isthmus as quickly "as taking a smoke." At Aspinwall (Colón), Captain William F. Gardner and the U.S.S. *Roanoke*, bearing the flag of Commodore William J. McCluny, were awaiting the visitors. The voyage to Sandy Hook, then to Hampton Roads (April 26–May 12), seems to have been relatively uneventful.

Meanwhile, elaborate preparations were being made at Washington to receive the visitors. Congress had appropriated \$50,000 for the entertainment of the embassy. This sum was later supplemented by funds made available by the cities of Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York. There is evidence that the "Japanese Committee" in New York spent \$105,000.⁷ In Washington special quarters at Willard's Hotel were already prepared, several of the rooms furnished in rich and luxurious style. The Navy Department, at the request of the Department of State, appointed three of its ablest officers to serve as a special "Protocol Committee": Captain Samuel F. Dupont, Commander Sidney S. Lee, and Lieutenant David D. Porter. Anton L. A. Portman was employed as interpreter. All four of these men had been recent visitors to Japan.⁸

This special committee, along with Henry Ledyard, son-in-law of Secretary of State Lewis Cass, were aboard the *Philadelphia* at Hampton Roads to welcome the Japanese. After short stops at


Fortress Monroe and Mount Vernon, the embassy reached the Navy Yard at Washington on May 14—3 months and 1 day after leaving Japan. A tremendous ovation awaited them.⁹

At 10 a.m. officers of the Navy Yard arrived and assembled in full dress in Commandant Franklin Buchanan's office for further orders. The military—marine, regulars, and volunteers—formed on the parade grounds in front of the landing, where Japanese and American flags were displayed. As the *Philadelphia* approached, a gun was fired and all employees of the Yard left their work to form lines on each side of the main avenue in front of the anchor house. Congress had adjourned so that members could attend the ceremony. For 2 hours before the arrival of the *Philadelphia*, continuous streams of interested and curious people arrived by carriages, buses, and on foot. Youngsters climbed atop piles of cannonballs and howitzers, even onto the roofs of the ship-houses. More than 4,000 persons were on hand at the Navy Yard, and some 20,000 took positions along the route of the procession.

On arrival of the embassy Captain Dahlgren ordered the usual 17-gun salute. Simultaneously a staff with large American and Japanese flags was raised. Government officials were already on hand. As the vessel was made fast, the Marine Band on the upper deck "discoursed the most delightful melodies" and the ever-present Japanese artists appeared on deck to make sketches of the crowd. On board, welcoming addresses were delivered by Mayor James G. Barret and Commandant Buchanan, a former member of the Perry Expedition.¹⁰

After an official photograph, special carriages conveyed the group to their quarters at Willard's Hotel, Pennsylvania Avenue at 14th Street, Northwest. There was a military escort with marching music. As the procession started, "all order came to an end," and the crowd broke through the lines, jostling the military and police and sometimes forcing the carriages to stop. The streets were so choked with eager humanity that it took an hour for the parade to reach the flag-bedecked Willard, where an honor guard of 100 soldiers awaited.

Throughout the arrival ceremonies the famous "Treaty Box," containing copies of the Treaty of July 29, 1858, and other appropriate documents, was conspicuous. It was reported to have been



National Archives, Washington, D.C.

The first Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States, photographed with their hosts at the Navy Yard, Washington. Seated, left to right: Tsukahara Jungoro, governor; Naruse Zenshiro, governor; Muragaki Awajino-Kami, second ambassador; Shimmi Buzen-no-Kami, first ambassador; Oguri Bungo-no-Kami, third ambassador; and Morita Okataw, treasury official.

three by two by one and one-half feet in dimensions, made of "very light wood, covered with the best lacquer [or "red morocco leather, stitched around the edges"] . . . lined with crimson silk," with lock, key, and hinges of gold. Borne by poles on the shoulders of four men, it preceded the ambassadors off the ship and was accorded a special place of honor in the procession.¹¹

One Washington newspaper thought the entire affair had been "most appropriately conducted" and that the arrangements throughout had been "marked by a happy mixture of democratic simplicity and official ceremony becoming the occasion and well-fitted to conciliate regard and confidence of our illustrious visitors, without departing from the plain and unpretending habits of our people."¹²

The Herald was also impressed with the Japanese: "With all of them ease and dignity are seen in happy combination; nothing seems to surprise

them, but everything attracts their attention and curiosity."¹³

From this time until the departure of the embassy from New York on June 30, the DuPont-Lee-Porter "Protocol Committee" was in charge of all arrangements.

The ambassadors turned first to their official duties. They immediately notified Secretary Cass of their arrival, called at the Department of State on May 16 to deliver a letter from the Japanese "foreign office," presented their credentials to President James Buchanan on May 17, and exchanged ratifications of the treaty on May 22.

The presentation of credentials was an especially "novel, striking, and interesting" ceremony, requiring an hour and 45 minutes. The principal officers, wearing colorful court dress, rode in carriages preceded by the Marine Band, flanked by U.S. Marines, and accompanied by Japanese guards with undrawn swords and ensigns carried


atop long poles—a strange procession as it moved from the Willard to the White House. The famous East Room was crowded to overflowing with civil and military officials in splendid dress and uniform, all anxious to catch a glimpse of the strangers. Announcement of their arrival caused a rush to the windows. During the ceremony that followed, three ladies and a Senator were noted standing on a single chair. The speeches were scarcely audible above the din, but the ceremony was performed with dignity and in the best oriental court tradition.¹⁴ The next day Secretary Cass entertained the visitors at a ball.

On the evening following the exchange of ratifications (May 22), the chief ambassador held a “levee” at the Willard. Many officials attended.¹⁵

With diplomatic business completed, the Japa-

nese sought opportunities to explore the life of the city. They visited the Halls of Congress. Of this one diarist wrote: “As we entered, a member was making a speech at the top of his voice. . . . There is no end to speakers . . . some speaking quietly, some wildly brandishing their arms. . . .”¹⁶

Three Japanese physicians who were members of the visiting party conferred with local counterparts, who were much impressed with their knowledge of medicine.¹⁷ Some time was spent at the Navy Yard and at the Smithsonian Institution, where one person at least mistook the costume wigs of the Presidents for hair preserved from dead men and placed on display—a “disgusting custom.”¹⁸ There were official discussions of coinage, and arrangements were made for the



Presentation of an American lady to the Japanese ambassadors at Willard's Hotel, Washington, D.C.

Historiographical Institute, Tokyo University

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ambassadors to visit the Mint at Philadelphia.

At the President's dinner on May 25, the "strange custom" of each man accompanying a lady to the table was cause for comment.¹⁹ Although the Japanese were unusually adept at imitating occidental etiquette, one diner drank the water from his finger bowl before realizing its intended use.

Meanwhile, the routine at Willard's Hotel was definitely disrupted. The Japanese visitors continued to be the objects of warm and keen interest to both sexes and to all classes. The embassy occupied some 60 rooms, an entire wing extending from Pennsylvania to F Street.²⁰ The eight soldier guards found it impossible to keep the halls cleared of curious sightseers. The lobby was constantly crowded with people seeking an opportunity to shake the hands and to secure the autographs of the visitors.²¹ The gifts intended for the President and other officials were for a time put on display.

There were dances, banquets, and magic-lantern shows at the hotel. The President attended one such show with no aides along—to the amazement of the Japanese. They were also surprised to see that there was "no policeman in the President's house and no fortress in his yard" and that the "home of the Secretary of State was not as fine as the Hotel."²²

Posing for photographers became almost burdensome except to a young interpreter, Tataiesi Owasjero, nicknamed "Tommy." This 17-year-old adopted son of the second interpreter had learned English at a Dutch school at Nagasaki. He had been a sort of "pet of the ship" en route to San Francisco.²³ In Washington, and later in Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York, he became a still greater favorite with the fairer sex. He made good use of his limited English vocabulary, learned to sing and whistle "Hail Columbia" and "Poppy [*sic*] Goes the Weasel," and acquired an extensive range of profanity. His recklessness and "spirit of deviltry" caused "beviess of maidens [to] gaze beneficently upon him . . . and to extend to him unreluctant hands." Of this "male coquette," a New York *Herald* correspondent wrote: "He smiles sweetly on all, and bestows on one the bouquet he gets from another." However, his popularity suffered somewhat when he tried to verify the impression that the hoops and superstructure of women's clothes were solid.²⁴

Some impressions acquired by the visitors regarding American life and habits are difficult to explain: (1) all Americans are Roman Catholics; (2) laws prohibit men and women from marrying before the ages of 21 and 18, respectively, for health reasons; (3) women's evening gowns generally cost \$1,000 to \$10,000; (4) it costs \$100,000 to construct a home.²⁵


The comment of Yanagawa Masakiyo on American newspapers still has some validity: "In Japan papers are printed once or twice a month but in western countries they are printed daily, although the news is only slightly different."²⁶

After a few weeks in Washington the visitors became anxious to return home. They declined invitations to visit Norfolk, Trenton, Jersey City, Boston, and Providence. At the last audience with the President on June 5, special commemorative gold medals were presented to the three envoys. Twenty silver copies and fifty bronze ones were given to them for distribution among their suite.²⁷

During the visit official gifts were exchanged. Those from Japan, earlier on display at the Willard, were described as being "of the richest materials and most elaborate workmanship, exceeding in beauty what even the highest estimate had made of Japanese taste and skill."²⁸ The State, War, and Navy Departments presented certain gifts in return, including some arms and munitions. Captain James W. Ripley of the Army and Lieutenant Henry A. Wise of the Navy were detailed to explain their construction and use.²⁹ The U.S. Agricultural Society presented a collection of nearly 100 varieties of field and garden seed.³⁰

When so many newly made friends called at the hotel to bid farewell, one member of the embassy admitted: "We all wept. Seeing them also weeping, we realized they are tender-hearted people."³¹

The impact of this group upon the life of Washington seems phenomenal when it is remembered that their visit coincided with the Republican nomination of Abraham Lincoln for the Presidency, the split in the Democratic Party, and the intensification of the national crisis preceding the Civil War. It is not clear whether or not the Japanese sensed the emergency-charged situation as they departed for short visits at Baltimore (June 8-9), Philadelphia (June 9-16), and New York (June 16-30).



Yokohama Municipal University

The Pagoda Car containing the Japanese treaty box, as it appeared in the procession on the day of the reception in New York, June 16, 1860.

In Baltimore the visitors were greeted enthusiastically with military escort, three bands, eight fire departments, and cheering crowds along the route to the Gilmer House. They were welcomed by Mayor Thomas Swann and John W. Garrett, president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. There was a fire-engine display in front of the hotel and fireworks at Monument Square. The Japanese artists sketched almost everything in sight; and "Tommy," permitted to hold the fire hose, "ducked without mercy" many of the spectators. Sewing machine manufacturers announced a special sale "to celebrate this great event and fix the date in the memory of thousands of our citizens."³²

The railway cars that took the group to Philadelphia were "fitted out in magnificent style" with sofas, cushioned chairs, rocking chairs, carpets, mirrors, and portraits of American leaders; and draped with flowers and the flags of the two nations. Large crowds appeared at the stations along the route. The embassy group seemed tired

except for "Tommy," who was exhibiting a daguerreotype of a Washington lady. He rode the engine much of the way and took particular delight in ringing the bell. Before the train arrived, Broad Street, "as far as eye could see, was one mass of people." After a speech of welcome by Mayor Alexander Henry, the procession moved slowly through "500,000 people" toward the Continental Hotel, with an escort of some 4,000 soldiers and 2,000 police. Many in the escort wore ribbons with inscriptions "Welcome to Our Japanese Friends." Japanese flags waved on all sides. Six hundred servicemen guarded the entrance of the hotel.³³

The Japanese were impressed by visits to the U.S. Mint, Independence Hall, Girard College, the city waterworks, and the Baldwin Locomotive Company. Some witnessed for the first time a balloon ascension and watched the operation of the new telegraph system connecting Philadelphia and New York. Widespread shopping expeditions and numerous gifts from local manufactur-

ers added to the value of the embassy's baggage by an estimated \$100,000. The Japanese seemed to be everywhere, and wherever they went they were well received. A 3-mile procession of firemen and musicians, some in Japanese costumes and wigs, added to the festivities of the last days and constituted an appropriate farewell as the visitors left for New York on June 16.³⁴

At every New Jersey station en route, great crowds turned out—"the females, as usual, foremost." "Tommy," attired in pants of a "loud pattern," received his usual attention: "delicate screams of women." His popularity had already caused him to substitute printed cards for the much-sought-after autographs.³⁵

New York, however, outdid all the other host cities in its reception and entertainment—a cannon salute at the Battery, a grand parade by circuitous route to the Metropolitan Hotel on Broadway, and a military escort of some 7,000. Second-story windows along the route reportedly rented for \$7. It took the procession more than an hour to pass a given point. The reception at the City Hall included speeches by Governor Edwin D. Morgan and Mayor Fernando Wood.³⁶

Among the spectators at the parade was Walt Whitman, who was inspired by the exciting spectacle to compose a long poem, "A Broadway Pageant," in which he sang of

... the Princes of Asia, swart-cheek'd princes,
First-comers, guests, two-sworded princes,
Lesson-giving princes, leaning back in their open
barouches, bareheaded, impassive. . . .

And, like a proud New Yorker, the poet wrote:

Superb-faced Manhattan!
Comrade American!—to us, then at last, the Orient
comes.
To us, my city,
Where our tall-topt marble and iron beauties range
on opposite sides—to walk in the space between,
To-day our Antipodes comes.

The grand ball at the Metropolitan Hotel on the night of June 25 was probably "the finest public entertainment ever given in this country," as evidenced by a two-page illustration in *Harper's Weekly*. It would seem that all important persons were on hand. Dinner was arranged for 10,000. Five bands were provided for the all-night dancers, estimated from 2,000 to 6,000, and a total crowd of some 20,000. The *New York Times* characterized the evening as a "triumph of

taste and brilliance" that will "long shine like a rose-pink lantern, or an apothecary's window in the civic annals of New York."³⁷

Theater owners vied with each other to get the distinguished visitors to their shows as a means of attracting greater crowds. Some of the current plays featured performers in Japanese costumes. Visits to the various points of interest were arranged within a most elaborate and expensive social schedule.

Before boarding the U.S.S. *Niagara* for the return voyage to Japan, the visitors called at the New York home of the widow of Commodore Perry. This was a fitting conclusion to the sojourn of the first Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States. One envoy expressed it in the following manner:³⁸

What a change in a few years! Today, six years after that great national crisis [Perry Expedition], we are here in the midst of the friendly American nation, welcome guests in the home of the very Commodore Perry whose great fleet might have stirred our peaceful land into battle! The time has come when no nation may remain isolated and refuse to take part in the affairs of the rest of the world.

The U.S.S. *Niagara*—repaired, remodeled, and redecorated—awaited the embassy. Some 100 boxes of gifts (official and private), samples of products, and purchases were moved aboard. These included examples of the latest weapons of warfare, books and maps of all kinds, field and garden seeds, and the varied products of American industry such as glassware, watches, coins, printing presses and type, hydraulic rams, sewing machines, false teeth, wooden legs, playing cards, and all sorts of ornaments.

The *Niagara*, under Captain William W. McKean, put to sea on June 30 with orders to make only necessary stops on the return voyage via the Cape of Good Hope. On November 9 the embassy disembarked at Yedo, where the Temple had been made ready for the reception of the ship's officers.³⁹ After an appropriate ceremony the chief officers of the embassy visited Townsend Harris to express their thanks.⁴⁰

This first diplomatic mission from the "Hermit Kingdom" to the West brought interesting and sometimes bewildering experiences to the envoys and their attendants. They were overcome by the informality and genuine friendliness of Americans. One naval officer characterized their reception at San Francisco as follows:⁴¹

Nothing struck me with so much surprise as the genial disposition of the people. Knowing as I did how our government treated foreigners, I expected a reciprocal treatment from the Americans; but what was my surprise when I found them so genial and kind, shaking hands friendly wherever I went and the children bringing me bouquets. As oft as I thought of the contrast of our treatment of Americans and theirs of us, I blushed and felt ashamed.

Another Japanese wrote regarding the reception in New York: "Here again, they were received with all that kindness of heart and freak of fancy could devise to honor and salute them."⁴²

Possibly the Americans overdid it a bit. Three years later, when another embassy was under consideration, a Japanese official "begged most earnestly that no such expensive reception should be given to it."⁴³

In any case, the Americans found their visitors to be a highly intelligent and interesting group, eagerly seeking knowledge and experiences strange to their traditional way of life, and attempting to interpret what they saw and heard in the light of their own culture and politics. They liked them. In a real sense the embassy completed what Perry had begun.

¹ John Bassett Moore, *A Digest of International Law* (Washington, 1906), V, 742.

² The Gregorian calendar is followed in this article. Japan did not adopt it until 1873.

³ Hunter Miller, *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America* (Washington, 1942), VII, 1077; Dept. of State, Despatches, Japan, II, No. 52, Nov. 15, 1859. In accounts of the mission the number varies from 71 to 93. The executive officer of the *Powhatan* indicated that there were 71 aboard (Lt. James D. Johnston, *China and Japan: Being a Narrative of the Cruise of the U.S. Steam-Ship Frigate Powhatan . . .*, (Philadelphia, 1860), p. 325). Contemporary newspapers usually placed the figure at 72, one of whom was taken ill at San Francisco and returned home aboard a Japanese vessel. The flag officer of the Home Fleet reported from both Aspinwall (Colón), Panama, and Sandy Hook that there were 72 aboard the U.S.S. *Roanoke* (Naval Records, Home Squadron, 1859-1860, Flag Officer W. J. McCluny, letters of Apr. 26 and May 9, 1860); yet the U.S. Government struck off 73 medals for distribution among the embassy (Miller, *Treaties*, VII, 1077, 1081). Two diarists with the mission place the figure at 77, then one proceeds to list 78 (Muragaki Awaji-no-Kami, "Diary of the First Japanese Embassy to the United States," *The First Japanese Embassy to the United States of America* (Tokyo, 1920), preface; Yanagawa Masakiyo, *The First Japanese Mission to America . . .* (Kobe, Japan, 1937), pp. 82-84).

⁴ For Japanese reactions to the experiences of the embassy, this article depends largely on the diaries kept by Muragaki Awaji-no-Kami and Yanagawa Masakiyo.

⁵ For accounts of the voyage of the *Kanrin Maru*, see *The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi* (Tokyo, 1948); and Report of Captain Brooke, Mar. 20, 1860, Naval Records, Officers Letters, No. 193. The accounts differ somewhat on the degree of dependence of the Japanese crew upon the more experienced American sailors.

⁶ San Francisco *Daily Evening Bulletin*, Mar. 23, 1860, p. 3.

⁷ Congressional Joint Res., Apr. 19, 1860; Inazo Nitobe, *The Intercourse between the United States and Japan . . .* (Baltimore, 1891), p. 161; *Harper's Weekly Magazine*, Aug. 4, 1860. Later the embassy proposed to distribute \$20,000 to persons aiding in their protection and entertainment, particularly the police of Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York, but were discouraged by the President and the Department of State (Acting Secretary Trescott to Captain DuPont, June 26, 1860, Dept. of State, Domestic Letters, LII, 387).

⁸ See Secretary Cass to Captain DuPont, Apr. 26, 28, 30, June 26, 1860, and Acting Secretary Trescott to Secretary of the Navy Toucey, July 9, 1860, Dept. of State, Domestic Letters, LII, 180, 181, 190-91, 193, 387, 427.

⁹ The arrival and visit of the embassy were extensively covered in the Washington papers: *The Constitution*, *The National Intelligencer*, and *The Star*.

¹⁰ *The Constitution* and *The National Intelligencer*, May 15, 16, 1860. The three Princes of the embassy were so impressed by the many kindnesses received at the hands of Commandant Buchanan that they sent a letter characterizing him as "one of the oldest and best friends of Japan and the Japanese" (*The National Intelligencer*, May 31, 1960).

¹¹ New York *Herald* and Frank Leslie's *Illustrated Newspaper*, May 26, 1860.

¹² *The Constitution*, May 15, 1860.

¹³ Quoted in *The First Japanese Embassy . . .* (Tokyo, 1920), p. 189.

¹⁴ *The National Intelligencer*, *The Constitution*, and *The Herald*, May 18, 1860.

¹⁵ *The National Intelligencer*, May 23, 1860.

¹⁶ Muragaki Awaji-no-Kami, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

¹⁷ *The National Intelligencer*, May 19, 1860.

¹⁸ Muragaki Awaji-no-Kami, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-51. At a later meeting at the Department of State, Secretary Cass reportedly remarked to the Japanese that he "did not know how they regulated their ladies, but in this country the ladies regulated the gentlemen. . . ." (*Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper*, June 2, 1860).

²⁰ *Harper's Weekly*, May 26, 1860.

²¹ Some of the visitors later had cards printed for distribution.

²² Yanagawa Masakiyo, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-52.

²³ A color likeness of Tommy may be found in Lt. James D. Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 378; a Brady photograph in *Harper's Weekly*, June 23, 1860.

²⁴ *Harper's Weekly*, June 2, 23, 1860.

²⁵ Yanagawa Masakiyo, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

²⁷ Miller, *Treaties*, VII, 1080-81. Similar silver medals were later sent to Naval Officers DuPont, Lee, and Porter along with a commendation for performing their "arduous and responsible duties . . . with consummate tact and discretion . . . [leaving nothing undone that] could gratify the curiosity or contribute to the comfort of the Embassy" (Naval Records, Acting Secretary of State to Secretary of War, July 7, 1860, Officers Letters, No. 3).

²⁸ *The National Intelligencer*, May 19, 1860.

²⁹ Acting Secretary Trescott to Harris, June 24, 1860, Dept. of State, Insts., Japan, I, 83-84.

³⁰ *The National Intelligencer*, May 30, 1860.

³¹ Yanagawa Masakiyo, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

³² *The Sun and Baltimore Clipper*, June 8-10, 1860. The theft of two Japanese swords somewhat marred the celebration at Baltimore. One was recovered and returned in 1863.

³³ *Public Ledger*, June 9, 11, 1860; Yanagawa Masakiyo, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

³⁴ *Public Ledger*, June 11-18, 1860; Yanagawa Masakiyo, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-71.

³⁵ *New York Times*, June 18, 25, 1860.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, June 16-30, 1860.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, June 26, 1860; *Harper's Weekly*, June 30, 1860.

³⁸ Muragaki Awaaji-no-Kami, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-73.

³⁹ Naval Records, Captain McKean to Secretary of Navy Toucey, Dec. 12, 1860, Captains Letters, Vol. 14.

⁴⁰ Miller, *Treaties*, VII, 1077-81; Harris to Secretary Cass, Nov. 19, 1860, Dept. of State, Despatches, Japan, III, No. 42.

⁴¹ Chief of Admiralty Kimura, as quoted in Nitobe, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 161-62.

⁴³ Pruyn to Seward, Dec. 1, 1863, *Diplomatic Correspondence* . . . , 1864, III, 463-64.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

86th Congress, 2d Session

The Technique of Soviet Propaganda. A study presented by the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 38 pp. [Committee print]

Admission of Refugees on Parole. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee on H.J. Res. 397, a joint resolution enabling the United States to participate in the resettlement of certain refugees. Serial No. 16. July 15, 1959-March 24, 1960. 68 pp.

Conventions on the Law of the Sea. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Executives J, K, L, M, N, 86th Congress, 2d session. January 20, 1960. 129 pp.

Missiles, Space, and Other Major Defense Matters. Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee in conjunction with Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee. February 2-March 16, 1960. 542 pp.

International Health. Supplemental hearings before a subcommittee of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on a joint resolution to establish a national institute for international health and medical research (with particular reference to availability of foreign currencies for use in connection with international health research). February 9, 1960. 63 pp.

Permanent Suspension of Duties on Coarse Wools. Hearing before the House Ways and Means Committee on H.R. 9322, a bill to make permanent the existing suspension of duties on certain coarse wools. February 29, 1960. 30 pp.

Revising Legislation on the Importation of Foreign Excess Property. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee on H.R. 9966, a bill to amend section 402 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949. March 1, 1960. 77 pp.

National Science Foundation. Comparison of United States and U.S.S.R. Science Education. Hearings before the subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. March 2, 1960. 74 pp.

Cotton Export Subsidy Program. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Cotton of the House Agriculture Committee. March 8, 1960. 62 pp.

Mutual Security Act of 1960. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on draft legislation to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. Part 5. March 14-21, 1960. 189 pp.

Report on the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Report by Clement J. Zablocki and James G. Fulton of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. H. Rept. 1385. March 14, 1960. 191 pp.

Report of the Special Study Mission to Asia, Western Pacific, Middle East, Southern Europe and North Africa. Report by a special study mission composed of members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. H. Rept. 1386. March 14, 1960. 84 pp.

Authorizing Service by Canadian Vessels for Certain Alaska Ports. Report to accompany H.R. 9599. H. Rept. 1400. March 15, 1960. 3 pp.

Liberalization of Restrictions Upon Immigration. Message from the President relative to urging the liberalization of some of our existing restrictions upon immigration. H. Doc. 360. March 17, 1960. 3 pp.

Our Export Trade. Message from the President. H. Doc. 359. March 17, 1960. 3 pp.

Mutual Security Act of 1960. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on draft legislation to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. Appendix and Index, Part 6. March 21, 1960. 238 pp.

Report on United States Military Operations and Mutual Security Programs Overseas. Report by Senator Dennis Chavez to the Senate Appropriations Committee. March 21, 1960. 214 pp. [Committee print]

Extensions of Export Control Act of 1949. Report to accompany H.R. 10550. H. Rept. 1415. March 23, 1960. 2 pp.

Rotation in Overseas Assignments of Civilian Employees Under the Defense Establishment. Hearing before the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee on H.R. 10695 and H.R. 10829, bills to provide for the rotation in overseas assignments of civilian employees under the defense establishment having career conditional and career appointments in the competitive civil service, and for other purposes. March 25, 1960. 29 pp.

Inter-American Cooperation Moves Forward

Address by Secretary Herter¹

I am grateful for this opportunity to meet here with the Council of the Organization of American States today as it gathers in celebration of Pan American Day in the 70th year since the founding of the inter-American system. Not only is this my first appearance before a protocolary session of the Council, but it happens by circumstance to be almost the first anniversary of my appointment as Secretary of State. The year has indeed been a momentous one in the history of the Organization, full of events of tremendous significance to the continued growth and development in the unique cooperative relationship which this Organization represents.

Speaking personally, I value highly the good fortune that has made it possible for me to journey twice to Latin America, once last August to attend the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Santiago² and again in February when I accompanied the President on his trip to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.³ The pleasure and stimulation gained from this experience of travel could only have been increased had my good fortune been extended by visiting all 20 of your countries.

Two such trips only half a year apart bring me to the inescapable conclusion that Latin America, still emergent and even nascent in some aspects within its present high level of attainment, is an area of tremendous development potential. It has most of the natural resources and all of the human resources for a steady and predictable rise in prominence and importance among the world

family of nations. The surge and pulse of this rise is a visible and tangible circumstance, to be seen and measured in the construction of new cities, the laying out of networks of roads, the building of schools, the spread of new industries. One can sense the trend of movement from rural areas and agriculture to urban living and industrial development, from limited suffrage to universal suffrage, from narrow exercise of authority to fully representative government. Here are many of the world's last great frontiers—the jungles of the Amazon basin, the isolated mountain valleys of the Andes, the almost inaccessible mineral deposits, the extensive farmlands of high potential in almost every country—all awaiting the conquest of advancement through new methods of health and sanitation or the construction of new means of communication. Here, too, one can sense the race between a bursting population growth and the upsurge of economic development that must provide more and more products and develop more and more jobs for larger numbers of people.

It seems to me that such convictions as we in the United States had on this score were reinforced by the President's recent visit to Latin America and that a new sense of urgency was communicated to us with respect to such participation as the United States, within the framework of worldwide commitments, can contribute.

The Inter-American System

Looking back across the intervening 70 years since the founding session of the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics, conceived principally as a clearinghouse for the interchange of commercial information, who among our predecessors then in attendance could possibly have foreseen that the humble seed they planted was to

¹ Made before the Council of the Organization of American States at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 20 (press release 200 dated Apr. 19).

² BULLETIN of Aug. 31, 1959, p. 290, and Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 28, 1960, p. 471.

grow into the all-encompassing structure that the Organization of American States is today? The soil that nurtures this rich growth is mutual cooperation.

Represented here today are 21 Republics, each sovereign and separate, each with its distinctive identity and national aspiration. For each the charter of the OAS confirms sovereign equality regardless of size or power. Each uses its equal voice in determining issues by the exercise of its vote in the democratic process of decision by the majority. Yet with all the express individuality and distinct character of its respective members, with all the diverse interests and separate aims of the various countries, with all the divergencies between widely differing peoples, this international assembly works with remarkable harmony toward its objective; and that objective, simply stated, is to provide a steadily improving way of life for the 360 million people it represents.

These 360 million individual human beings, wherever they may be in whatever country, provide the measure by which their chosen representatives must guide their actions. The individual citizen is today the common denominator of all representative government and of all foreign policy wherever there is freedom of choice. The "common man" is the initial charge that sets in motion the dynamo of democracy that impels the forces of change toward a better way of life.

At the present stage in the evolution of international affairs within this hemisphere, attainment of the normal aspirations of the individual citizen may require drastic revisions in existing social, economic, and political institutions. These aspirations toward a general improvement in living conditions, toward the elimination as rapidly as possible of the consequences of poverty and ignorance, must be recognized by the OAS itself and by the individual countries that are represented here. They should be achieved in liberty and with a dedication to international peace and harmonious cooperation as reflected in the guiding principles of the Organization of American States, which are prime requisites to the accomplishment of its objectives.

Throughout the many years of its history the genius of the inter-American system has been its capacity to reconcile principles and forces that have at times appeared to be in conflict. If sovereign states had refused to yield when purely national interests appeared to conflict with the

general international interests of the whole assembly of nations, if each had chosen to adopt only principles that were in perfect accord with its individual goals, the Organization of American States could not have moved forward to the high level of attainment that it has reached today. Many of these conflicts have proven to be more apparent than real, especially in the light of shared benefits that have accrued to every nation through mutual international accord.

Implementing Fundamental Principles

In similar respect a partial success in improving the living standards of the individual citizen is not enough. The achievement of material progress, for example, falls short of the need unless it is accompanied by the equally important attainment of liberty based upon respect for human rights and representative democracy as described in the Declaration of Santiago agreed upon at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs last August.⁴ This statement declares that the "principles and attributes of the democratic system in this hemisphere" must include such essentials as the rule of law assured by separation of powers, free elections to choose governments, judicial procedures to protect individual freedom and human rights, freedom of information and expression, and effective control of the legality of governmental acts. It further points out that political proscription, perpetuation in power, and the exercise of power without a fixed term are manifestly contrary to democratic order in the Americas.

However lofty and hopeful might be the fundamental principles of an international organization, their application within the borders of the member nations is often not easy. All of us will do well to bear in mind that those who judge will also be judged. It seems to me that the Organization as a whole must be willing to concede that each member may have its own special problems and its individual circumstances that may make progress appear very slow in the translation of broad principles into specific actions within each country.

Yet it would be a matter of no small concern to the Organization as a whole if its member nations agree to the broad principles but seek

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

to travel only their separate paths in application. My view is that for member nations to maintain their own self-respect in the community of this hemisphere there needs to be a genuine endeavor to implement within their respective borders the fundamental principles to which their international representatives have signed agreement. We can all hope that recognition of this essential fact will bring with it the maturity and calm judgment required for the official conduct of governments in our present-day relationships.

To reach the root of many problems facing our hemisphere requires a methodical study of the existing and potential resources to meet present and future needs. Many of these studies have been underway through the various entities of the Organization of American States. The far-sighted initiative of Operation Pan America,⁵ calling for detailed economic surveys of the countries of the Americas, is an important concept that will bear fruitful results within the near future in planning and organizing new projects on the basis of specific needs.

Accomplishments of the OAS

That the Organization of American States has been an instrument of accomplishment is manifest in many ways. Defense against aggression, from within or without the hemisphere, is now the concern of the whole American community rather than any single nation; and sums formerly spent for defense against neighbors can increasingly be safely devoted to economic development. The twin pillars of nonintervention and collective action are now firmly cemented into the foundations of our tested and proved system of inter-American security. Astonishing progress has been achieved toward the goal of eradicating malaria and other diseases from our hemisphere. A regional development bank has become a reality. A major breakthrough has been registered in the discovery of a highly nutritious food, called *incaparina*, to combat the high mortality of young children. Important groundwork has been laid in establishing a common market and a free-trade association. The benefits of agricultural research already are evident in many ways, such as the development of new cattle breeds more adaptable

to Latin American conditions. Even the launching of promising young artists on careers of worldwide acclaim, plus a long list of other achievements in the general field of culture and education, are commendable efforts that likely could not happen except for the existence of some form of international organization.

In my view the achievements and the work actually underway in the areas of cooperation are often less noticed than they should be, given the apparently irresistible attraction of controversy and conflict. Steady, constructive, carefully planned progress in any of the many fields of human interest and endeavor in which we cooperate, both in the OAS and between ourselves, may not be as dramatic as if it were actively punctuated with sweeping slogans; but in the long run it may actually move farther. For example, the OAS has long recognized the need for extensive efforts in the field of housing. The many activities of the Inter-American Housing and Planning Center in Bogotá, Colombia, are demonstrating results in the development of new building materials and inexpensive construction methods that will be of enormous importance in the solution of one of the most fundamental problems of our people. I am well aware of the close cooperation between the Center and certain of the projects in this significant field that has been aided by my Government. Among others these include the low-cost housing project in Chile which President Eisenhower visited recently and which he and others of us who accompanied him found to be among the interesting points of the tour. These and similar endeavors are carried forward under the concept of "self-help and mutual aid" that might well be taken as key words in our international relationships.

If we support the premise that the dignity of the individual in a free society is strengthened when he acquires his own home, so must we also recognize the importance of land ownership to the man who works the land. While there is much arable land not in economic use—properties owned both publicly or privately that are difficult of access or not put to full use—small farmers by the hundreds of thousands must make their living from tiny plots that yearly become more depleted from too intensive development. Land distribution is a problem of the hemisphere, demanding the attention of all nations and the Organization

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, June 30, 1958, p. 1090, and Oct. 13, 1958, p. 574.

of American States as a whole. The establishment of adequate credit facilities to assist small farmers in purchasing land, the establishment of adequate facilities to confer title to new owners, and the adoption of appropriate fiscal policies to promote more effective use and facilitate transfer of poorly utilized land are measures demanding urgent attention.

Withstanding Foreign Ideologies

It will serve us well to remember that the mind of the individual citizen is the object of a great ideological conflict that divides our world. One side thrives on the ills of mankind—poverty, hunger, disease, ignorance, upheaval—while the other strives for man's natural desires—for individual freedom, human dignity, and personal well-being. Any international organization that hopes for and works for solid accomplishment will need to recognize that its framework must be solid and durable to withstand the constant probing of new and subtle forms for exploiting whatever forms of weakness may exist.

Under a system of free elections and representative government, the day will likely never dawn in this hemisphere when the majority voter of any country will freely choose his own complete subjugation to the state. It is contrary to all reasonable supposition to conceive that the voter of the Americas, in any considerable number, would ever willingly enslave himself to a monolithic economy, surrender his individual freedom, renounce whatever religion he may hold, or relegate himself to the status of landless servitor to a new class of bureaucratic aristocracy. Since the imposition of such a system through force, threat, or subversion would be a denial of basic principles for which the OAS stands and therefore could not be allowed to exist, and since its appeal to the voter is traditionally small in all areas of the world, the continued progress toward ever more valid democracy in each of our native lands is the real promise of life in our hemisphere.

If an ideology that is foreign to our hemisphere has little chance of taking root here, the state of harmony within the hemisphere will bear some attention. Each country should assume a certain responsibility toward the fundamental principles

of the inter-American system. To quote from the Santiago declaration:

Harmony among the American republics can be effective only insofar as human rights and fundamental freedoms and the exercise of representative democracy are a reality within each one of them, since experience has demonstrated that the lack of respect for such principles is a source of widespread disturbance and gives rise to emigrations that cause frequent and grave political tensions between the state that they leave and the states that receive them;

The truth in these statements is self-evident. After all, most of the basic principles of the Organization of American States are as hallowed in time as that ancient day when separate civilizations first realized they had to try to exist in harmony together. In many ways the Declaration of Santiago is an echo of the words so wisely stated many years ago by that great freedom fighter José Martí:

America must encourage every means of bringing the American peoples closer to one another, and reject everything that keeps them apart. In this, as in all human problems, the future is of peace.

By the fact of the frozen wastelands that lie above and below and the great oceans that swirl on either side of our continents, we are all neighbors. Give us, each one of the 21 Republics, each independent and yet interdependent, the maturity and foresight and thoughtfulness to be good neighbors. There is not one among our countries that cannot help the others; there is not one that cannot receive help from the others; there is not one that will not profit through the mutual well-being of all.

Dr. McHugh Named to Tropical Tuna Commission

The White House announced on April 22 that the President had on that day appointed J. Laurence McHugh, chief, Division of Biological Research, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, to be a U.S. Commissioner on the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, vice Arnie J. Soumela, resigned.

The International Lead and Zinc Study Group

by C. W. Nichols¹

The Lead and Zinc Study Group is very young. Its first regular session was held at Geneva only 2 months ago, and some of its activities have hardly begun. Yet this new organization already has influence in the lead and zinc industries throughout the world. The Group is not only recognized; it is even given credit for some substantial changes which have come about during the past year in the tenor and outlook of international trade in lead and zinc. Because of the relationships between domestic and international markets, the Study Group can be important not only to importers and exporters but to all producers, consumers, and merchants of these materials.

Strictly speaking, the curtailments of international supplies which were in effect during 1959 should not be attributed to the Study Group. Those curtailments, and the Study Group itself, were the separate, joint products of the preceding exploratory conferences and an interim committee. The Study Group, however, has become the continuing machinery. It is naturally now thought of as an extension of the international discussions which began before it was organized.

The Study Group is an autonomous intergovernmental body. The members are national governments. Membership is open to any government which is a member of the United Nations, or of its specialized agencies, or is a contracting party

to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, if the government considers itself substantially interested in the production, consumption, or trade of lead or zinc.

Twenty-five governments have accepted membership.² All continents are represented. The member countries account for more than 90 percent of estimated world production, consumption, and trade of lead and zinc, ore and metal.

The members participate in sessions of the Study Group through national delegations which include officials of government and representatives of industry. Industry representatives have already contributed a great deal to the work. It is hoped and believed that their participation can be further increased.

The Study Group has its own rules of procedure. Its terms of reference permit considerable flexibility in operations. There is no fixed schedule of meetings. These are held at times and places decided by the members according to circumstances. The normal procedure is for the discussions in the Study Group to be held in private

² Members of the International Lead and Zinc Study Group are:

Australia	Netherlands
Belgian Congo	Norway
Belgium	Peru
Canada	Poland
Czechoslovakia	Spain
Finland	Sweden
France	Union of South Africa
Guatemala	Union of Soviet
Federal Republic of Germany	Socialist Republics
India	United Kingdom of
Italy	Great Britain and
Japan	Northern Ireland
Mexico	United States
Morocco	of America
	Yugoslavia

¹ Address made before a joint session of the Lead Industries Association, the American Zinc Institute, and the Galvanizers Committee at St. Louis, Mo., on Apr. 7. Mr. Nichols, who is Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the first meeting of the International Lead and Zinc Study Group, held at Geneva Jan. 27-Feb. 3, 1960.

and for the decisions of the Group to be taken according to the sense of the meeting, without voting.

The Group is authorized to make studies, arrange for the gathering of statistics, consider possible solutions to special difficulties, and submit to member governments reports which may include suggestions or recommendations.

The Group has no regulatory authority. Membership involves no obligation upon a government as regards the production, consumption, or trade of its country. The Group is to remain in existence as long as the participating governments think it useful. A member government is free to withdraw at any time.

Relationship of Group to United Nations

For the present, a small office and staff in New York are being provided to the Group by the United Nations on a reimbursable basis. The budget for 1960 is very modest. Part of the expenses are being shared equally by the member governments, the remainder being allocated among members in proportion to their volume of international trade, taking account of exports and imports.

The size and functions of the headquarters staff are presently at a minimum. These could be expanded if the members desired in time to establish statistical or publications programs, as other study groups have done. The present disposition of the Lead and Zinc Group is to rely upon existing sources of statistics as far as possible but to exert an influence toward improvement and extension of existing statistical work.

The close association of administrative operations with the United Nations at this time was considered necessary to enable the Study Group to begin to function more easily and speedily. This opportunity to obtain staff services from the U.N. makes a variety of professional skills in the larger organization available as required. The assistance of the U.N. is also reducing the expense of operation. These initial organizational arrangements are provisional; they will be reviewed and may be revised if the members so decide.

As long as the operations of the Study Group are related so closely to the United Nations, the meetings of the Group will probably be at New York or Geneva, since those are the locations where the U.N. maintains conference facilities.

The Study Group could meet elsewhere, especially if a member government should extend an invitation to host a particular session. This has been a common practice of other commodity study groups. The next full session of the Lead and Zinc Study Group is expected to be in early September of this year, probably in Geneva, but a definite decision has not yet been taken concerning either the date or the place.

Functions of the Standing Committee

The Study Group has established a Standing Committee to deal with matters requiring attention between full sessions. The Standing Committee manages the budget, directs the secretariat, keeps the lead and zinc situation under review, and makes plans for future meetings of the full Group. The Standing Committee includes all members of the Group who wish to participate in its work. This committee elects its own officers. The officers of the Standing Committee are expected normally to be the same individuals, or in part the same individuals, who are at the time holding offices in the Study Group to which they have been elected at full meetings. The Study Group currently elects its own officers for a term of 1 year, which may be extended until successors have taken office.

The Group has appointed a small panel of persons who are specially qualified in the field of statistics to consider the data now available concerning lead and zinc on a world basis and the improvements which might be made in this data. This panel will report to the Standing Committee before the next Study Group meeting.

The Study Group is primarily a forum through which the members can seek and obtain more information and a better understanding of the outlook and the attitudes of others. It provides opportunities to correct misunderstandings and misconceptions and should help in avoiding them. The full meetings of the Group are its principal activity and its chief opportunity to accomplish its purpose. The staff, the Standing Committee, and the other activities have a supporting relationship. While the full meetings are the high spots of the program, there is a great deal of preparatory work in advance of each of these meetings, and each meeting can generate followup activity extending through all or much of the interval until another session.

Delegations

Each delegation to a Study Group meeting represents its government in an official capacity. The delegation must act as a unit in expressing official views.

Necessary guidance for the U.S. delegation is developed by our Government in advance of each Study Group meeting, after appropriate consultations among the responsible officials and with the industries concerned. Considerable effort has been made, both by government and industry, to insure that our delegation is adequately organized and equipped to represent this country effectively.

The U.S. delegations have included officials from several departments principally concerned and industry members appointed officially following their nomination by representative segments of industry. The industry members of the delegation serve without expense to the Government. The delegation needs to be representative of the interests concerned and needs to include a variety of specialized qualifications, but it also needs to be reasonably compact in size. It is sometimes a problem to hold the membership of the delegation within effective working limits. The delegation is appointed for a particular meeting and completes its work when its report on that meeting is submitted.

Commodity Problems

The newly organized Study Group comes on a stage which already has a giant backdrop of world concern with the problems and interests involved in international trade of primary commodities. Nationalism is a strong force in the commodity field, but there is also an increasing recognition, especially since the Second World War, of the interdependence among nations in a world situation.

As governments have taken greater responsibilities for economic affairs, commodity policies have created for these governments a set of new and more active relationships with private companies and with other governments.

The waste and distress that can be caused by extreme economic cycles and excessive fluctuations in the prices of major commodities have become an ever more pressing concern as stronger emphasis is placed on the maintenance of high levels of productive employment and a steady economic development at home and abroad. Great efforts

are made to encourage a flow of private and public capital into less industrialized countries, but this international investment and its broad objectives can be seriously undermined in many of those countries if their earnings on the commodities they export do not show long-term growth with reasonable stability along the way.

Direct and detailed controls for purposes of stabilization have been undertaken in some commodities. The record of peacetime regulation has not been too impressive, either on a national or an international scale. But the world is in no mood to embrace fatalism. People are not inclined, either in the United States or in other countries, to regard the hardships of extreme price fluctuations as an affliction which is unavoidable.

Severe instability in external markets can increase greatly the problems which national governments face in pursuing liberal policies toward international trade.

These problems of primary commodities have engaged and continue to engage the serious attention of many international bodies. No panaceas have been discovered, but most governments place a high priority on a continuing search for ways to moderate instability and reduce the causes of international friction. The General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly discussed the objectives toward which international cooperation should be directed in the field of commodity problems. So have the Economic and Social Council, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the Organization of American States. The Commission on International Commodity Trade was established for this purpose. Commodity problems have been emphasized in the sessions of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. None of these general organizations, however, has been able to devote continuing attention in depth to any particular commodity situation.

Specialized Commodity Study Groups

Specialized study groups for some commodities have existed for many years. One of the best known is the International Cotton Advisory Committee, which had its origins before the Second World War and has functioned on a broadly representative and active basis since 1945. This Committee has made itself the hub of extensive and authoritative information on cotton and has pro-

Terms of Reference of the International Lead and Zinc Study Group¹

Membership

1. Membership of the International Lead and Zinc Study Group shall be open to the Governments of States Members of the United Nations or of appropriate specialized agencies or to Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which consider themselves substantially interested in the production or consumption of or trade in lead and zinc.

Functions

2. The group shall provide opportunities for appropriate intergovernmental consultations on international trade in lead and/or zinc and shall make such studies of the world situation in lead and zinc, as it sees fit, having regard especially to the desirability of providing continuous accurate information regarding the supply and demand position and of its probable development. For this purpose the group shall arrange for the collection and dissemination of statistics, making use of existing sources so far as practicable.

3. The group shall, as appropriate, consider possible solutions to any special problems or difficulties which exist or may be expected to arise in lead or zinc and are unlikely to be resolved in the ordinary development of world trade.

4. The group may report to Member Governments. Such reports may include suggestions and/or recommendations.

5. For the purpose of these terms of reference,

¹ U.N. doc. E/CONF. 31/1, Annex A.

lead and zinc shall include scraps, wastes and/or residues and such lead and zinc products as the group may determine.

Operation of Study Group

6. The group shall meet at times and places mutually convenient to its members.

7. The group shall adopt such rules of procedure as are considered necessary to carry out its functions.

8. The group shall make such secretariat arrangements as it may deem necessary for the proper conduct of its work.

9. The participating Governments shall contribute to the expenses of the group on a basis to be determined by it.

10. The group shall remain in existence as long as it continues, in the opinion of the participating Governments, to serve a useful purpose.

11. The group shall make such arrangements as it considers appropriate by which information may be exchanged with the interested non-participating Governments of the States referred to in paragraph 1 and with appropriate non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations. The group shall co-operate in particular with the Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements which, under resolution 557 F (XVIII) of the Economic and Social Council, has the function of co-ordinating the activities of study groups and councils.

duced many competent studies concerning the world cotton situation. The question of an international cotton agreement has received serious attention in this Committee on more than one occasion, but proposals for intergovernmental regulation have not advanced beyond the stage of discussion.

The International Wool Study Group, although in existence since 1947, has not been as active as the Cotton Advisory Committee.

The International Rubber Study Group, established in 1945, has been useful to its members in making their way together through a succession of striking developments, including reconstruction from wartime disruption, growth of a large synthetic industry, emerging political independence

of areas which are the leading exporters of natural rubber, large-scale stockpiling, and, more recently, some liquidation from the stockpiles of natural rubber. The Rubber Study Group has assisted international trade in such matters as standardization of grades and improvements in type sampling. Its most valuable contribution, perhaps, has been the development and dissemination of authoritative statistics or estimates on the production, consumption, trade, and stocks of all types of rubber on a worldwide basis and authoritative forecasts of production and consumption year by year. Like the Cotton Advisory Committee, the Rubber Study Group has at times given serious consideration to the possibility of an international agreement which would control the trade

in rubber, but on each occasion the members have decided that no general advantage could be expected from proceeding with such a project.

Coffee, cocoa, rice, and other commodities have also had study groups, and the activities of each have been tailored to the problems of the particular commodity and the desire of the member governments to use this method of consultation.

A few commodities, notably wheat, sugar, and tin, are subject to specific intergovernmental agreements. Each of these agreements is administered by an international council which, of course, is not concerned directly with any other commodity. The functions of those councils are quite different from those of the commodity study groups.

Some commodities have received much more intergovernmental attention than others. The amount of international trade is not in itself the controlling factor. Each of the leading world commodities has some special characteristics which affect the interests of governments and the methods they think desirable for pursuing those interests. Some commodity study groups have been formed in response to an immediate, more or less fortuitous, situation. Study groups have only endured, however, and proven to have continuing usefulness in those commodities where a considerable number of importing and exporting countries found continuing reason to keep developments under joint review.

A happy situation in a world commodity presumably would be one in which there were not enough uncertainties or problems for governments to attach much importance to a study group. Where the commodity is sufficiently important, however, and the need for a study group is felt widely, these practical considerations are usually controlling rather than any theory about the desirability of study groups in principle.

Need for Study of Lead and Zinc Problems

Lead and zinc constitute in some respects a more complicated problem than other international commodities. Lead and zinc may be more in need of a study group because of the special circumstances under which these two materials are produced, marketed, and consumed. Other commodities are not affected to the same extent by characteristics such as large-scale recovery of secondary material, predominance of joint produc-

tion at the mine, and a substantial volume of international trade in concentrates as well as in metal.

In 1957 and 1958, when the problems of instability in some nonferrous metals were giving increasing concern to a number of governments, there was no specialized international machinery available for multilateral consultation. Inquiries were made through United Nations channels, and the replies indicated that many governments would be interested in an exploratory meeting to consider the position and prospects of copper, lead, and zinc. The Secretary-General of the United Nations then issued invitations for this purpose, and the meeting was held at London in September 1958.

The discussions in that meeting led the participants to the conclusion that there was no need for special action on copper. Several problems were exposed in lead and zinc, however, both of a long-term and a short-term nature, which appeared to require further careful consideration. As a possible means of dealing with the short-term problems, the London meeting suggested that governments should consider a reduction of exports or production for 1 year, with machinery for a prompt review if conditions changed. Governments were also asked to consider the establishment of a lead and zinc study group which could provide a framework for continuing cooperation with respect to long-term problems. In addition, the exploratory meeting arranged for a review of the available statistics to determine whether these provided satisfactory data for intergovernmental discussions of lead and zinc.

After allowing some time for separate study by governments, a second meeting was called, concerned entirely with lead and zinc, and this took place at Geneva in November 1958. Meanwhile, the United States had established import quotas by action taken under the escape-clause procedure of the trade agreements program.³ The world trade situation for lead and zinc was somewhat different from that which had existed at the time of the London meeting. Some delegations at Geneva thought that a further period of time would be required in order to appraise the outlook under the new circumstances. The discussions in November 1958 recognized that the lead and zinc

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 13, 1958, pp. 579 and 583.

markets were out of balance, but no action was taken at that time to curtail international supplies. Recommendations were made for the formation of a lead and zinc study group and for further efforts to improve the world statistics which governments could use in judging the position and considering proposals for adjustment.

The interested governments came together again in late April and early May of 1959 at New York and took preliminary steps toward organizing the Lead and Zinc Study Group. A substantial excess of supplies in both metals still appeared to be in prospect at the time of the New York meeting, if no allowance were made for certain reductions and limitations then under consideration. The meeting, however, received reports of specific curtailments to be made in a number of countries and estimated that, after allowance for these, the world excess of lead metal would be reduced to an annual rate of 59,000 tons in the second half of 1959 and the excess for zinc metal would be reduced to about 16,000 tons.

These undertakings of which the New York meeting took notice were separate and voluntary. They entailed no formal commitments. It was clearly the view of the meeting, however, that these measures would improve the relationship between supply and demand, pending further review at a subsequent meeting. The New York discussions gave strong support to the announced limitations as a general method of approaching the short-term problem.

Study Group's Program for 1960

The first regular session of the Lead and Zinc Study Group was held at Geneva, January 27 to February 3, 1960, being preceded by a special statistical session. The consensus at this meeting was that there is no need at present for continued limitations on international supplies of zinc. The meeting noted with approval the plans in a number of countries to curtail marketings of lead until at least September 30, 1960, and considered those plans to be helpful in the interest of a current balance.

Twenty-four of the twenty-five members were represented by delegations at the recent meeting.⁴ The delegations included, in the aggregate, somewhat more than 100 persons. Some member gov-

ernments accredited only one or two persons, but others were represented by about half a dozen to a dozen. Approximately one-half of the individuals in attendance were officials of governments; the others were representatives of industries in their respective countries.

The normal procedure in meetings of the full Study Group and some of its committees, such as the Administrative Committee and the Economic Committee, in the recent session has been for each delegation to have a single spokesman, usually an official of the particular government. Participation in the discussion has been more general in other committees or subcommittees where more technical subjects were under consideration. This was especially true in various statistical groups. Representatives of industry have taken a direct and major part in those discussions. There are, of course, also many informal exchanges of views among participants on the occasion of Study Group meetings, and these become an important part of the total proceedings.

As the Study Group embarks on its full program in 1960, it will have the benefit of the experience which has been gained in the operation of other somewhat similar bodies. A commodity study group is no longer thought of as strictly temporary or as a prelude to a commodity agreement. Instead, the primary emphasis is on the question whether a continuing program of exchanging information and views can substantially increase the degree of stability in the lead and zinc industries on a world basis simply by promoting better and wider understanding, earlier and more accurate appreciation of trends, and a more responsible approach to problems of common international concern. If the member countries believe that this is possible and attach importance to a greater degree of stability in these industries than they have had, then the main problem of the Study Group is to devise the most effective methods of operation for these purposes.

Organizing the Meetings

This will involve a question of ways to organize and conduct the meetings to make them most productive. Multilateral discussions have superseded the former reliance upon bilateral procedures. Some new techniques have evolved to facilitate this development in the conduct of international commodity relations, but the usual

⁴ Guatemala was not represented.

procedures still draw heavily upon the forms which were traditionally employed for debate or negotiations. Since the chief purposes of the Study Group are the development of information and exploration of views, there appears to be a need for some further evolution away from traditional procedures in order to draw into the deliberations a more active participation by a larger number of the people in attendance, and with less formality. The depth and range of substantive discussion might be increased considerably, to the benefit of all member countries, if the proceedings offered greater opportunity for active participation in the discussions by additional members of the delegations, especially industry representatives, it being understood, of course, that they would be expressing their individual views.

With these considerations in mind, it has been suggested that future sessions of the Study Group might include a special committee on production, consumption, and trade. This part of the Study Group session could be organized as an exploration of technical and economic questions, open to all members of the delegations. Specific topics could be on the agenda, and papers might be circulated in advance to focus the discussion. There need not be any attempt to reach conclusions, but a report of the discussion would be made to the full Study Group. It is recognized that an arrangement of this kind could present some dangers. There certainly would be problems which have not yet been fully explored. But the member governments have already recognized that reliance on customary procedures may not draw out the full contributions which persons in attendance are capable of making. The Group believes that some improvements can be devised which will be practical and will make the meetings more valuable in projecting future trends.

Need for Adequate Communication

Another problem will be that of drawing upon a sufficient cross section in industry and other competent sources for information and views which can help in preparing for Study Group meetings. Similarly, after each meeting it will be necessary to make sure that the course and outcome of Study Group discussions are known clearly and widely in the industries concerned so that the Study Group sessions will have a tangible influence on the actual conduct of industrial operations in the

direction of the greater stability in which member governments are interested.

The operations of producers and consumers might be influenced in important respects, and in a generally constructive direction, by the work of the Study Group. For example, a more responsible management of stocks might become more justifiable and more likely. Some erratic variations in commercial stocks, even though conceived by individual companies as being defensive, have, in the aggregate, made an aggressive addition to the destabilizing influences otherwise at work. There is also a possibility that some important consuming industries will attach such significance to stability in their raw materials that if they believe the prospects for reasonable stability in lead and zinc are being improved, they will be more willing to plan on the use of these materials. This could be a basic contribution to the expansion of consumption, which is the dominant consideration in a satisfactory future development.

Since the personnel of each delegation and the total attendance at Study Group sessions must be somewhat limited, this problem of adequate communication with many other people in member countries, both before and after Study Group sessions, will need very careful attention, perhaps most especially in the United States.

The Group may have to decide whether it will consider the possibilities of an international agreement involving buffer stocks, export restrictions, or other controls. The terms of reference would permit this subject to be raised. The question would be whether any considerable number of member governments thought that a full examination of such proposals would be useful. Some members have already indicated their view that it will be appropriate for the Study Group to discuss regulatory measures for purposes of stabilization. Other members have made clear that they believe the long-term interests of lead and zinc on a world basis will best be served by avoiding additional controls.

The United States Government maintains its well-known position that there are few situations in which intergovernmental commodity agreements are appropriate or desirable. The U.S. view emphasizes that the circumstances in which lead and zinc are produced, sold, and consumed make it very doubtful that an intergovernmental agreement to control either or both of these materials would be feasible of negotiation or operation.

There are, of course, some areas of interest to lead and zinc in which the Study Group cannot be expected to perform. For example, the Group cannot participate in the programs of research, product development, and commercial promotion which the industries in several countries are pursuing. These, however, have been noted in the Study Group discussions. They are recognized as having highly constructive possibilities. The Group appreciates the necessity to avoid actions which might prejudice the success of these important programs.

The Study Group cannot be expected to lend itself to advancing the interests of some members at the expense of others in those matters upon which there are conflicts of interest. The focus of the Group will have to be in the area of common interest, that is, the expansion of consumption at a substantial and rather regular rate with increasing requirements being supplied at reasonably stable prices and with the recognition that a workable balance of supplies and requirements is important to longtime growth. This is the plane of mutual interest where a basis can be found for effective cooperation among producers and consumers, exporters and importers.

The Study Group is not an instrument through which fast action or quick results can be obtained. Its eventual influence, however, could be deep and wide in the industries which supply or require lead or zinc.

Progress has been made in the ability and the desire of the national delegations to cooperate in matters of common interest. The members are distinguishing more clearly than they did a year or two ago the subjects and the types of activities which can usefully be undertaken in this forum and those which cannot.

What comes out of the Group must depend on what the member countries put into it. The beginning is auspicious. The indications are favorable. There is wide participation, and the Study Group has active support. It could become the center in a net of worldwide information and communication. The Study Group is a good tool for important work: to raise the level of understanding in many places, reduce the causes of international discord, and improve the prospects for growth in the lead and zinc industries without serious interruption.

Documents on Test Ban Talks Made Available

Press release 198 dated April 19

The Department of State on April 19 made available for reference the verbatims¹ and agreed documents² of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests for the period from October 31, 1958, to February 29, 1960. The release was made pursuant to an agreement reached last month by the three negotiating parties, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R.

When the negotiations commenced on October 31, 1958, the three nations involved agreed to conduct the Conference sessions in private. However, in view of the long duration of the Conference, the three parties have decided to make available to the public transcripts of past sessions through February 29, 1960. Transcripts and documents for sessions after this date will be released on a monthly basis 1 month after the sessions take place. Accordingly, release of the March verbatims and agreed documents will be made on May 1, 1960, and the April verbatims and documents on June 1, 1960. This procedure will be followed for release of the verbatims of subsequent sessions.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography³

Security Council

Interim Report by the Secretary-General Under Security Council Resolution S/4300. Report regarding South Africa. S/4305. April 19, 1960. 1 p.

General Assembly

Economic Development of Under-developed Countries. Report by the Secretary-General on measures taken by the governments of member states to further the

¹ Not printed.

² Copies of the agreed documents (drafts of a preamble and various articles of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, together with a draft annex on a preparatory commission) are available upon request from the Office of Public Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

³ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

economic development of underdeveloped countries in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1316 (XIII): additional replies from governments. A/4220/Add. 5. April 15, 1960. 25 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Teaching of the Purposes and Principles, the Structure and Activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies in Schools and Other Educational Institutions of Member States. Addendum to the report by the U.N. Secretary-General and the UNESCO Director-General. E/3322/Add. 1, February 26, 1960, 7 pp.; Add. 2, March 25, 1960, 27 pp.; and Add. 3, April 1, 1960, 3 pp.

Commission on Human Rights/Commission on the Status of Women. Study of Discrimination in Education. E/CN.4/802/Add. 1. March 1, 1960. 20 pp.

Statistical Commission. Statistics of Profit-and-Loss and Balance-Sheet Accounts. E/CN.3/260. March 3, 1960. 24 pp.

Economic Commission for Europe. The Commission's Programme of Work for 1960/1961. E/ECE/384. March 3, 1960. 41 pp.

Statistical Commission. International Definition and Measurement of Levels of Living. Progress report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.3/270. March 9, 1960. 32 pp.

Consideration of the Provisional Agenda for the Thirtieth Session. Note by the Secretary-General. E/3331. March 11, 1960. 11 pp.

Economic Commission for Latin America. Progress Report by the Secretariat on the Common Market Programme. E/CN.12/AC.45/3. March 15, 1960. 47 pp.

Statistical Commission. Problems and Methods in the Gathering of Representative and Comparable Wholesale Price Series. E/CN.3/264. March 15, 1960. 50 pp.

Statistical Commission. Progress Report on the Comparison of the Industrial Statistics Systems in Selected Highly Industrialized Countries. E/CN.3/281. March 17, 1960. 30 pp.

Progress Report of the United Nations Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources Covering the Work of its First Two Sessions. E/3354. March 18, 1960. 19 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

International Court of Justice

Statute of the International Court of Justice (59 Stat. 1055).

Declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction deposited (with conditions): Honduras, March 10, 1960. Effective for an indefinite period.

Safety at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Signed at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Acceptances deposited: Australia, October 6, 1959; Korea, March 10, 1960.

Sugar

International sugar agreement of 1958. Done at London December 1, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1959; for the United States October 9, 1959. TIAS 4389.

Ratifications deposited: Portugal, March 21, 1960; Federal Republic of Germany, March 28, 1960.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement for the loan of two U.S. submarines to Argentina. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 4 and April 1, 1960. Entered into force April 1, 1960.

Agreement renewing the agreement of April 23 and 28, 1958, relating to the establishment of a U.S. Air Force mission to conduct high-level meteorological tests in Argentina (TIAS 4037). Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires April 4 and 8, 1960. Entered into force April 8, 1960.

Colombia

Agreement for the loan of a destroyer to Colombia. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá April 5 and 7, 1960. Entered into force April 7, 1960.

Ireland

Agreement providing a grant to assist in the acquisition of certain nuclear research and training equipment and materials. Effected by exchange of notes at Dublin March 24, 1960.

Entered into force: April 7, 1960.

Korea

Agreement extending the period of the loan of 14 U.S. naval vessels to Korea, under the terms of the agreement of January 29, 1955 (TIAS 3163). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul March 28 and April 1, 1960. Entered into force April 1, 1960.

New Zealand

Understanding that the assurances contained in the agreement of June 19, 1952 (TIAS 2590), are applicable to equipment, materials, information, and services furnished under the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (22 U.S.C. 1751), as amended, and such other applicable U.S. laws as may come into effect. Effected by exchange of notes at Wellington March 25, 1960. Entered into force March 25, 1960.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on April 20 confirmed Leland Barrows to be Ambassador to the State of Cameroun. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 174 dated April 7.)

Agriculture. Don Paarlberg Named Coordinator of Food-for-Peace Program	743
American Republics	
Dr. McHugh Named to Tropical Tuna Commission .	757
Inter-American Cooperation Moves Forward (Herter)	754
Atomic Energy. Documents on Test Ban Talks Made Available	765
Cameroun. Barrows confirmed as Ambassador .	766
Canada. U.S. and Canada To Hold Talks on Wilderness Preserves	739
Congress, The. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy	753
Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations (Barrows)	766
Disarmament	
American Foreign Policy Today (Dillon)	723
The Approach to the Summit (Berding)	729
Economic Affairs	
American Foreign Policy Today (Dillon)	723
The International Lead and Zinc Study Group (Nichols)	758
North American Broadcasting Agreement Enters Into Force	734
Proposed Waiver of Cargo Preference Rule on Indus Project Explained (Casey, Dillon)	740
Senate Confirms Louis Cabot as U.S. Representative to ECE	743
Europe. Senate Confirms Louis Cabot as U.S. Representative to ECE	743
Germany	
American Foreign Policy Today (Dillon)	723
The Approach to the Summit (Berding)	729
India. Proposed Waiver of Cargo Preference Rule on Indus Project Explained (Casey, Dillon) . . .	740
International Organizations and Conferences	
Documents on Test Ban Talks Made Available . .	765
Dr. McHugh Named to Tropical Tuna Commission .	757
Inter-American Cooperation Moves Forward (Herter)	754
The International Lead and Zinc Study Group (Nichols)	758
Senate Confirms Louis Cabot as U.S. Representative to ECE	743
Japan. The First Japanese Diplomatic Mission to the United States—1860 (Parks)	744
Mutual Security. Proposed Waiver of Cargo Preference Rule on Indus Project Explained (Casey, Dillon)	740
Pakistan. Proposed Waiver of Cargo Preference Rule on Indus Project Explained (Casey, Dillon) .	740
Science. National and International Science (Brode)	735

Treaty Information	
Current Actions	766
North American Broadcasting Agreement Enters Into Force	734
Turkey. Letters of Credence (Esenbel)	734
U.S.S.R.	
American Foreign Policy Today (Dillon)	723
The Approach to the Summit (Berding)	729
United Nations. Current U.N. Documents	765

Name Index

Barrows, Leland	766
Berding, Andrew H	729
Brode, Wallace R	735
Cabot, Louis Wellington	743
Casey, Ralph E	742
Dillon, Douglas	723, 741
Esenbel, Melih	734
Herter, Secretary	754
Nichols, C. W	758
Parks, E. Taylor	744

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 18-24

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

No.	Date	Subject
*197	4/18	Cultural exchange.
198	4/19	Nuclear test conference documents.
199	4/19	Question of cargo preference on Indus basin project.
200	4/19	Herter: "Inter-American Cooperation Moves Forward."
201	4/20	North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement.
202	4/20	Dillon: "American Foreign Policy Today."
†203	4/20	Travel of U.S. newsmen to Communist China.
†204	4/20	Hanes: "The Citizen and Foreign Policy."
205	4/22	Turkey credentials (rewrite).
†206	4/22	CENTO delegation (rewrite).
†207	4/22	Program for visit of King and Queen of Nepal (rewrite).
†209	4/23	Bunker: American Society of Newspaper Editors.
210	4/23	Berding: "The Approach to the Summit."
†211	4/22	Jones: American Society of Newspaper Editors.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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TREATIES IN FORCE . . .

January 1, 1960

This publication is a guide to treaties and other international agreements in force between the United States and other countries at the beginning of the current year.

The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of countries which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for each agreement.

Documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States are listed in the appendix.

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the information contained in *Treaties in Force*, is published weekly in the *Department of State Bulletin*.

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